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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation : ‘Fair Weight’: Empowering Member States through 
goal based voting weight for effective implementation 
of IMO instruments 
 
Degree                        :  MSc 
 
This dissertation is an endeavour to introduce the concept of ‘‘Fair Weight’’ 
defined as a goal-based voting weight that would empower Member States to 
ensure effective implementation of IMO instruments.  
 
The evolution of IMO as an international organization for maritime related 
matters shall be studied to understand the existing decision making process of 
IMO instruments. In addition, the dimensions of voting weights utilized for 
equality of representation in the decision making process of IMO shall be studied. 
Furthermore, the impact of the tacit acceptance procedure and open registry on 
these dimensions of voting weights shall be evaluated to understand the 
appropriate representation of Member States within the IMO decision making 
process. 
 
Decision making processes of international organizations, such as United Nations 
and its selected agencies, shall be reviewed in the light of their purpose and 
methodology used for Member States representation. 
  
The need for reforms in the IMO decision making process shall be identified by 
computing the voting power of Member States. ‘‘Fair Weight’’, based on various 
classifiers that define the IMO instrument, shall be recommended to be utilized 
for equality of representation in the decision making process of IMO.  
 
The concluding chapter discusses the increased representation due to ‘‘Fair 
Weight’’ of Member States in IMO decision making process leading to their 
empowerment in effectively implementing IMO instruments. 
 
KEYWORDS: IMSAS, Decision making in IMO instruments, Tonnage, Voting 
power in IMO, EU Coalition, Voting power index, ‘‘Fair Weight’’, Member State 
representation in IMO. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International organizations that have been entrusted with the responsibility of 
‘global governance’ often experience problems gaining member support for 
ambitious policy initiatives. It can be more difficult to achieve effective 
implementation and enforcement of an organization’s instruments. As laid down 
in its Charter, organization must act in direct relation with its purpose and 
objectives.  Political, social, economic, constitutional legalities intertwined with 
other factors add to the complexity of the global governance when adopting rules 
that are to be uniform and mutually acceptable by the entire population.  
International organizations are mostly facilitators and therefore totally dependent 
on and reflective of its Member States. The ineffectiveness in implementing and 
enforcing Conventions and amendments adoption by Member States needs to be 
analysed by looking at the instrument itself for possible gaps. There is a need to 
understand why these challenges exist by in-depth research into the root cause of 
the problem.   
1.1. Background 
 
The world commerce is largely dependent on the international trade. Almost 90 
% of international trade by volume is carried out by ships. Most countries are 
dependent upon each other for various types of cargo and therefore the shipping 
industry plays a vital role for economic growth. It is imperative for a maritime 
nation to conform to the international rules governing its maritime industry in 
order to achieve sustainability. Though it is the sovereign right of a State to abstain 
from ratification of the various maritime conventions, the “No favourable 
treatment” by other Port States compel vessels to comply, often leading Member 
States to sign a Convention to which it may not wholly agree with.  
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Upon the request of the United Nations (UN) Commission on sustainable 
development (CSD 7), developed procedures to ensure that the flag States give 
justified effect to the IMO and other international Conventions to which the flag 
States are Party as per IMO, Resolution A. 1070 (28). The Resolution 
categorically mentioned the primary responsibility of the State to have adequate 
and effective system to control their registered ships and to ensure satisfactory 
compliance with the international regulations with respect to the maritime safety, 
security and protection of the marine environment. In addition to the flag State 
responsibilities and obligations, the State, as a port State and Coastal State also 
have responsibilities and obligations under applicable international law for similar 
reasons.  
IMO carried out voluntary audits under the “Voluntary IMO Member State Audit 
Scheme” (VIMSAS) to verify the effective implementation of IMO Instruments.  
A comprehensive analysis of difficulties encountered in the implementation of 
IMO instruments was undertaken by IMO and documented in their report III 
1/INF23. This analysis was based on audits of 52 Member States equating to about 
31% of the membership of the organization, two associate members and five 
dependant territories, altogether 59 States totalling gross tonnage of 92.8 % of the 
total world tonnage as shown in graph 1 below.  
Overall 550 findings constituting 201 non-conformities and 349 observations 
were revealed out of which 53.6% of the findings were related to flag State 
responsibilities and obligation  followed by common areas (28.7%), Port state 
(9.2%) and coastal states (8.3%) as shown in graph 2 below. The analysis further 
reflected that the coastal State major 18 findings (39.1%) were related to 
implementation, the major port State 25 findings (49%) were related to 
enforcement, the major common areas 62 findings (39.2%) were related to initial 
actions (legislation), and the major flag State 88 findings (29.8%) were related to 
implementation. 
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Graph 1: Percentage of audited world gross tonnage 
 
(Source: International Maritime Organization [IMO]. (2014). III/1/INF.23) 
 
Graph 2: Percentage distribution of Findings for various parts of III Code 
 
(Source: International Maritime Organization [IMO]. (2014). III/1/INF.23) 
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The non-conformities relating to IMO mandatory Conventions as shown in graph 
3 below, were 45% for SOLAS 1974, 32% for MARPOL 1973 / 78, 10% for 
STCW 1978, 8% for LL 1966, 3% for TONNAGE 1969, and 1% for COLREG 
1972. The major areas identified under SOLAS 1974 were authorization of ROs, 
communication of information, general obligations under the Convention and 
inspection and survey. Major areas identified under MARPOL were the provisions 
of communication of information, general obligations and surveys. Major areas 
identified under STCW 1978 were under the provisions of reporting of 
dispensations and quality standards, followed by general obligations. COLREG 
1972 did not show any major problems while LL 1966 and Tonnage had some 
problems with communication of information.  
 
Graph 3: Percentage distribution of Findings as per IMO instruments 
 
(Source: International Maritime Organization [IMO]. (2014). III/1/INF.23) 
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The findings of the VIMSAS revealed that the IMO instruments were not 
effectively implemented by the Member States leading to adoption of “IMO 
Member State Audit Scheme” (IMSAS) by IMO through Resolution A. 1067(28). 
The item 5.1 of the Resolution states that the objective of the audit is to find out 
the extent of implementation and enforcement of applicable IMO instruments by 
Member States. The paper intends to review the analysis of the voluntary audits 
from a different perspective to identify ways for improving the effective 
implementation of IMO instruments by Member States. 
 
1.2. Problem statement 
Freedom to sail in the seas all over the world globalized the shipping industry. 
This character of shipping required uniform global standards throughout the 
maritime nations. Increasing loss of life at sea of the passengers and crew and the 
ever increasing awareness of the impact of pollution on marine environment raised 
serious concerns that required immediate attention from the shipping industry. 
Strict national regulations would have resulted in unbalanced playing field 
causing economical loss to national shipping. The shipping industry which had 
been traditionally self-regulated therefore required support from the Governments 
to regulate the technical matters related to safety and pollution prevention from 
ships.  
 
In 1948, during a Geneva Conference, the United Nations called for adoption of 
the International Maritime Convention to address the need for handing 
international maritime issues. It took a decade to enter into force in 1958 in the 
formation of the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) 
as some States with large shipping interest were suspicious of IMCO’s function 
and role (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 52). IMCO was famously perceived to be ship-owners 
club for protecting the interests of the ship-owners and its constitution and various 
law provisions endorsed that (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 64). In order to gain reputable 
recognition as a leader in global maritime governance, IMCO went through 
 
 
6 
 
iterations of its constitution including changing its name to International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) in 1982.  
The IMO, later gained widespread acceptance for establishing borderless rules and 
standards. Although the name was changed but somehow the voting structure and 
ideology of protecting ship-owners interest remained the same way.  The IMO has 
been successful at avoiding scrutiny for this lack of change unlike the European 
Union (EU), United Nations (UN), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) which 
had to undergo relatively recent voting reforms.  
The Commonwealth Heads of Government held a meeting in 2008 to reform 
International Institutions. Its statement identified the need for obtaining 
legitimacy from Member States and wider international community. 
Responsiveness, fairness, transparency and accountability were listed as the basic 
principles associated with legitimacy. The communique from the G-20, London 
summit in 2009 on the financial crisis associated legitimacy to effectiveness and 
raised concerns over the need for improving representation, accountability and 
voice (Bernstein, 2011, p. 18). It is imperative to understand the social legitimacy 
of an International Organization (IO) as it influences the IOs potential to make a 
difference.  
 
In general, legitimacy is often seen as central for the effectiveness of political 
institutions. Legitimate IOs can easily attract the resources required for their 
persistence and secure compliance of their established principles. The IOs do not 
have coercion as a means of social control and so they experience problems 
gaining State support for ambitious policy goals, securing national ratification of 
negotiated agreements, and achieving effective compliance with IO rules and 
norms (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2014, p. 3). The social legitimacy of the IMO as an 
IO needs to be studied to understand if it has any impact on the ineffective IMO 
instrument’s implementation. 
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The voting systems of IO traditionally consider States to be singular and sovereign 
legal entities but there have been lots of debates over the issue. The opponents of 
the system advocated that the allocation of votes in the IOs should be based on the 
characteristics of the individual States such as its population and or its resources. 
There is a distinction between equal voting indicating sovereign equality and the 
equal representation indicating weighted representation in terms of population or 
contribution to the IO (Payton, 2012, p. 8). The IMO, through the decision making 
process for conditions of entry into force utilizes a combination of sovereign 
equality and equal representation voting system. 
 
The IMO report III 1/INF23, “Comprehensive analysis of difficulties encountered 
in the implementation of IMO instruments” showed that 59 States constituting 
92.8 % of the total world tonnage were audited leaving 115 States with just 7.2% 
unaudited as per graph 1. The unaudited 115 Member States constituting 7.2% of 
world gross tonnage equates to an average of approximately 0.063% tonnage 
representation for each State which is basically negligible as can be seen from 
graph 1. The decision to evoke mandatory audits for all Member States was 
decided on audits of just 59 States which is approximately 34% of the entire 
membership but constituted 92.8% of world tonnage.  
 
The 115 remaining Member States, due to their negligible tonnage representation 
could be considered as coastal and port States. Referring to graph 2, the findings 
for coastal and port State were only 8.3% and 9.2% respectively. This means that 
these coastal States (66%) having practically no tonnage are subjected to 
mandatory audit because of the poor performance of 59 flag States (34%). It could 
be concluded that 34% members constituting 92.8% world tonnage are able to 
take decisions in the IMO or for that matter 5 Member States (3%) constituting 
50% world tonnage take decisions for the world maritime industry. This leads to 
the following research questions. 
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1. Does the current voting system reflect basic fundamental philosophy, mission, 
and objectives of the IMO?  
2.  Are the challenges of implementation a result of states’ not being adequately 
represented in IMO’s decision making process?   
1.3. Objective and aims 
 
The overall objective of the study is to introduce the concept of ‘‘Fair Weight’’ 
defined as the goal-based voting weight that could be justifiably utilized in the 
decision making process of IMO for effective implementation of its instruments. 
Following are the specific aims of the study:  
 
1. Identify the parameters that affect the voting weight representation of the 
Member State in the IMO decision making process.  
2. Review the decision making methodology of other international organizations 
like the UN and its selected agencies like the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
understand the representation of their Member states. 
3. Evaluate voting weight and various power indices of Member States of IMO 
in decision making process of IMO and identify gaps needing reforms. 
4. Recommend voting weight that will ensure better representation of Member 
States that would empower them for effective implementation of IMO 
instruments.  
1.4. Research methodology 
 
Research methodology adopted was secondary research through literature review 
and content analysis. 
  
The IMO, through their document III 1/INF23 on the “Comprehensive analysis of 
difficulties encountered in the implementation of IMO instruments” published the 
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results of the various findings raised during the VIMSAS audit. It has been 
recognized through the data that flag States have not been effectively 
implementing the IMO instruments which they ratified. The paper endeavours to 
review the data from the perspective of global governance in order to understand 
the relationship between effectiveness and appropriate representation in the 
decision making methodology of IMO. ‘Effectiveness’ is considered as the 
variable dependent on the independent variable ‘Representation’ in the IMO 
decision making process. 
 
The paper intends to understand the historical factors leading to the formation of 
IMO’s decision making process as an international organization. The paper will 
further research to understand the dimensions of voting weight and the parameters 
that influence the voting weight of the Member States in their representation in 
the IMO decision making process. In order to get insight of the problem, the paper 
will refer to the literature on the history of IMO and review the decision making 
process through the conditions for entry into force of the typical mandatory 
instruments of IMO. 
  
The paper will then conduct a comprehensive analysis into the decision making 
methodologies adopted by various other international organizations like the UN 
and its selected agencies like the ICAO, IMF, and the WTO. The review of the 
decision making methodologies of these organizations will assist in understanding 
the representation of the Member States in these organizations. 
 
The paper then argues over the inadequate representation of Member States in 
IMO decision making process and identifies gaps utilizing the game-theoretic 
approach of voting power computation. The 2013 data for the world tonnage 
distribution as per flag, given in table 3 of appendix 1 has been considered to 
evaluate the voting power. This data is definitely not the same as the data at the 
time of adoption of various IMO instrument. However, it gives a better 
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understanding of the scenario. The paper finally introduces the ‘Fair Weight’, a 
performance based voting weight that would ensure better representation of 
Member States thereby empowering them for implementing IMO instruments 
effectively. The computation of the ‘Fair Weight’ is beyond the scope of this 
paper, however, an attempt will be made to compute the ‘Fair Weight’ in the 
simplest form. 
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2. VOTING WEIGHT IN IMO 
2.1. Evolution of IMO 
 
The voting weight in the decision making methodology of IMO could be best 
studied under the light of its evolution and purpose. Formerly called as “Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization”, formed in 1948 as a result of 
a Convention adopted by UN Maritime Conference. Article 70 of the Convention 
stated the requirements for its entry into force (Arroyo, 1991, p. 19). The 
Convention entered in force on March 17, 1958 after ratification by 21 Member 
States, seven of which were having at least 0.1 million gross tons of registered 
shipping. IMCO received its designation as UN specialized agency in 1975.  
IMCO’s main objective was to develop international treaties and other 
instruments on maritime safety, discourage practices which are discriminatory, 
restrictive, and unfair in international trade by those concerned with shipping, and 
to control maritime pollution from ships ("International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)," n.d.). The 1948 Convention is IMO’s constitutive instrument and has 
been amended several times by the Organization’s Assembly, most significantly 
to amend the size of the council, establish new Committees, and clarify its 
purposes and to change its name (Chircop, 2015, p. 417). The IMO thus went 
through many institutional changes in its structure. 
One of the changes in IMCO was the adoption of the tacit acceptance procedure. 
Amendments of IMCO regulations required acceptance of two-third of 
Contracting Parties for entering into force. The tacit acceptance procedure 
required explicit objection by one-third Contracting Parties or by Contracting 
Parties constituting 50% of world tonnage to reject the amendment. Tacit 
acceptance procedure significantly reduced the reliance on a majority of flag states 
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to actively express their acceptance of amendments (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 63). The 
IMO could speedily amend its instruments with the changing technology. 
The 1978 amendment to the Geneva Convention resulted in all Member States 
getting Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) membership which was earlier 
restricted to fourteen members out of which eight were for the largest ship-owning 
nations. This institutional change ended the bias towards representation of 
maritime interests within the MSC and helped IMCO in countering the criticism 
being referred as ship-owners club (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 64). This was perhaps the 
most important decision giving IMCO the recognition of representing the world 
maritime industry as a whole and not limiting to ship-owners. 
Adoption of the MARPOL 1973 Convention brought in an explicit environment 
mandate for IMCO which in 1975 led to the establishment of the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee having all Member States as members. The 
growing environmental concerns required change in the aims of the organization. 
Hence in 1977, with effect from 1984, the aims of the Organization was modified 
and included encouragement and facilitation of adoption of the highest practicable 
standards in issues concerned with maritime safety, navigation efficiency and 
ships related prevention and control of marine pollution  (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 64). 
The guiding principles of the Organization can be found in Article 1(a) of the 
Convention which was to provide mechanisms for cooperation among 
Governments in the field of national regulations and practices relating to technical 
matters affecting shipping engaged in international trade. IMO was therefore 
empowered to deal with the administrative and legal matters of the maritime 
industry.  
The “accepted rules and standards adopted by competent IOs for shipping” 
provision of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) 
posed problem for IMCO due to the words intergovernmental in its name and the 
dominant authority of ship-owning states. During that period, IMCO was little 
known and there were mis-conceptions about its function. In order to make IMCO 
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a credible and competent IO, the amendment to the Geneva Convention that 
entered into force in 1982, changed the name from IMCO to IMO. This was 
primarily done to put the ship-owning states on equal foot with other States 
(Leeuwen, 2010, pp. 63-64). IMO soon gained unrivalled recognition for 
developing rules and standards for international acceptance. 
Efforts were thus made to change the formal orientation of IMCO to facilitate 
cooperation of likeminded developed maritime states to IMO that accepted States 
with coastal concerns as equal members. What they did not do was to change the 
traditional decision making methodology through conditions for entry into force 
of an instrument and thereby ensured that the voting power remains with the ship-
owning nations. The decision making process of IMO in adopting and bringing an 
instrument into force is discussed in the subsequent section. 
2.2. Decision making process 
 
The decision making process for bringing an IMO instrument into force starts 
from the submission of a proposal and lasts until the instrument enters into force. 
This process can be studied using a two-pronged approach, the adoption of 
instrument and its entry into force. 
2.2.1. Adopting an instrument 
 
IMO instruments can generally be seen as IMO Conventions or associated 
amendments. The basic procedure of the adoption of instruments can be found on 
the IMO website: www. Imo.org. IMO’s Assembly, Council, Maritime Safety 
Committee, Marine Environment Protection Committee, Legal Committee and 
the Facilitation Committee are its six main organs concerned with the adoption of 
its instruments. Proposal for an instrument is raised in any of these Committees 
by Member State or by a group of Member States. Proposal could also be raised 
by an international organization. The proposal is then sent to the Council and to 
the Assembly if required upon reaching agreement. From legal and political 
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perspective, this gives an impression of consensus methodology adopted by the 
Member States. 
As per IMO, the Assembly or Council then authorizes the Committee to proceed 
with the work of drafting the instrument. Committees and the Sub-Committees 
start drafting the instrument with the help of representatives of Member States and 
opinion of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) is also considered. Draft 
instrument thus prepared is communicated to the Council and the Assembly along 
with a recommendation for convening a conference for formal adoption of the 
draft by consensus of the Member States. These conferences are international and 
open to all Governments. Organizations having official relationship with IMO are 
also requested to participate as observers in the conference. The important aspect 
to know here is that all the Member States participate on an equal footing.  
IMO circulates the draft instrument to all the invited Governments and 
organizations for their comments. This way of getting consensus is termed as the 
‘Process consensus’ or ‘Active consensus’. The process consensus implies a 
negotiating style whose end goal will produce a consensus among the negotiating 
Parties. This methodology was extensively used in UNCLOS negotiations in order 
to produce a universally agreed solution (Payton, 2010, p. 3).  The draft instrument 
and comments are scrutinized by the Conference and amended as necessary to 
prepare draft that would be acceptable to the majority of the Governments present. 
Conditions for entry into force of the instrument are also included in the draft and 
therefore it is construed that these conditions are negotiated. The Article 24 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention outlines the criteria for entry into force of a maritime 
convention. As per this Article, the member States negotiate and decide the 
adequate voting requirements for a proposed IMO instrument. 
It is understood from here that the entry into force conditions for the instrument 
are negotiated and consensus is taken. Once a consensus is taken, there is no need 
for voting. However, Article 53 of the IMO Convention has a provision where the 
purpose of voting in the Assembly, the Council, and the Committees of Maritime 
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Safety, Legal or Marine Environment Protection are described. Each Member 
State has one vote and decisions are taken on majority vote of the present members 
who vote. For those decisions requiring two-third majority, two-third majority of 
the members present is required.   
2.2.2. Entry into force 
 
Entry into force of the adopted instrument is the most important and final decision 
making stage of the instrument as once entered into force, the instrument is 
binding on the Contracting Parties. Most of the IMO instruments require consent 
by defined number of member States constituting defined percentage of world 
tonnage to enter into force. Therefore, it is quite evident that the representation in 
IMO is through Member States’ consent and tonnage as the voting weight.  
The text of Article 53 of the IMO Convention: “Except as otherwise provided in 
the Convention or in any international agreement which confers functions on the 
Assembly….” This expression allow for the provisions of incorporating the voting 
requirement for any new proposed instrument as desired by the Member States. 
Hence the entry into force conditions are included in every instrument but not 
always uniform. Member States negotiate the conditions for entry into force 
separately for every instrument. As per IMO, conditions for the entry into force of 
an instrument depends upon the complexity of the instrument.  
The equality representation using Member States’ consent and tonnage as the 
voting weight in IMO decision making process is further explored to understand 
the dimensions of the voting weight in IMO’s decision making process. The 
impact of various parameters on these dimensions of voting weight are then 
researched to analyse whether tonnage as representation qualifies to be considered 
as voting weight in IMO decision making process. 
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2.3. Dimensions of voting weight 
 
It was mentioned earlier that the conditions for bringing an IMO instrument into 
force is negotiated between the member States as per “Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 1969”, Article 24.  Consensus of the Member States is taken for 
determining conditions of entry into force of an IMO instrument. In practise, the 
negotiations among the Member States boil down to the requirement of the 
consent of a predefined number of States constituting a predefined percentage of 
world tonnage for entry into force of an IMO instrument. The conditions for 
accepting and rejecting an amendment for the instrument are also specified in the 
parent Convention.  Thus a Member States’ voting weight would be a combination 
of its consent and the percentage of world tonnage registered with it.  
2.3.1. Consent by Member State 
 
As indicated by IMO in the section of Convention on their website, imo.org, the 
procedures to be bound by a treaty or instrument through expression of consent is 
defined in the Articles of the proposed instrument of IMO. As per IMO, signature, 
acceptance, approval, ratification, and accession are some of the procedures for 
Member States’ consent expression. State’s intention to recognize the signature to 
that effect emerges from the full powers of its representatives as mentioned during 
the negotiations as per Article 12.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969. As per Article 18(a) of this Convention, A Member State might 
sign a treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. The signature, in such 
cases is not construed as consent of the Member State to the treaty. However, the 
Member State is obliged to refrain from activities that go against the purpose and 
objective of the treaty until it decides not to be Party to the treaty.  
The treaty is open for signature for a specified period and then comes into force 
when the conditions are met. This decision making process for bringing an 
instrument into force could be understood to be equivalent to a sequential coalition 
voting system where Members join the coalition in random order. Each Member 
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State is entitled for one vote for its consent. Instruments like the Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR) did not require tonnage. In such cases, 
Member States enjoy equal voting weight through the principle of sovereign 
equality.   
Most of the decision making of IMO instruments are based on the principle of 
equality by representation. This generally require consent of only 25 Member 
States constituting 50% of world tonnage or sometimes only requiring 15 Member 
States constituting 50% of world tonnage, as evident in SOLAS protocols 1978, 
SOLAS protocol 1988, and MARPOL Convention.  The consent of a Member 
State with meagre or no tonnage play an important role only when the criteria for 
tonnage is met and the decision is pending to meet the requirement of number of 
States.  
The membership of IMO (as given in Table 2 of Appendix 1)  increased from 85 
in 1974 to 174 in 2014 including three associate members is not reflected in the 
conditions for entry into force of various IMO instruments adopted during the 
period. The condition of consent from 25 Member States out of 85 in 1974 
constitutes approximately 29.42 % representation in the decision making process, 
while 25 out of 174 in 2014 constitutes approximately 14.37% representation. 
This is an evidence that the actual representation of Member States in the decision 
making process of IMO instruments for their entry into force has been reduced by 
half in last four decades, or that the 25 large tonnage members have substantially 
increased their voting power further lop-siding the voting representation. 
2.3.2. Tonnage 
 
The IMCO Convention 1948, initially designed to have exclusive and dominant 
traditional maritime nations with effective interests in maritime safety as original 
members of the committee (Odeke, 2007, p. 55). Traditional maritime nations 
during that period were the “largest ship-owning nations” and were thought to 
have “effective interest in maritime safety”. However there were disagreements 
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on the specific definition of the term “largest ship-owning nation”. The judgement 
was subsequently given by International Court of Justice to be the tonnage owned 
or belonged to States. In the absence of practical means of measuring the ship-
owning parameter, the Court therefore concluded that tonnage registered was 
appropriate criterion and not beneficially-owned tonnage (Odeke, 2007, p. 70).  
Registered tonnage of a Member State equates to its voting weight in IMO 
decision making process. Because tonnage is not uniformly distributed within the 
Member States, the voting weight of the Member States vary. States with large 
tonnage will have large voting weight and States with less tonnage will have less 
voting weight. Voting power of the Member State will therefore vary depending 
on the majority requirement of voting weight for the subject instrument and the 
Member States order of joining the sequential coalition.  
The world gross tonnage being concentrated among very few countries widens the 
gap between the voting power of these countries and the rest of the maritime 
nations with meagre or no tonnage. The 50% tonnage requirement for most of the 
IMO instruments suggest that it is the majority of the tonnage that the IMO is 
representing for its decision making process. IMO, as a facilitating body is 
representing only the ships by means of its tonnage and not the larger community 
of maritime stakeholders of the Member States.  
2.3.3. Influence of tacit acceptance procedure and open registry 
 
The earlier sections on consent of a Member State and the tonnage as its voting 
weight indicate the role of tonnage as the major parameter in evaluating the voting 
weight and voting power of Member States in influencing the outcome of an IMO 
instrument. The following sections discuss the impacts of Tacit Acceptance 
Procedure and Open Registry on the voting weight of a Member State. 
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Tacit acceptance procedure 
The need for frequent revisions of technical instruments to keep pace with rapidly 
changing technology strained the accepted practices deriving from the law of 
treaties, and the requirements in national constitutions regarding ratification. 
Most of the technical organizations around the world faced this problem 
(Rosenne, 1999, p. 263-264). It would have been difficult to keep the existing 
Conventions updated without the tacit acceptance procedure and thus 
jeopardizing IMO’s role as the international platform for technical matters 
involving shipping.  
The IMO has described the tacit acceptance procedure in their section on 
“Conventions” in their website imo.org. As indicated by IMO, tacit acceptance 
procedure means that the amendment adopting body at the same time, decides a 
time period within which Contracting Parties has opportunity to notify their 
decision on acceptance, rejection or their silence on the subject amendment. In 
case of silence, the amendment is considered as accepted by the silent party.  
In case of IMO instruments, tacit acceptance procedure is incorporated in the 
Articles for amendment of the parent Convention. The tacit acceptance procedure 
have been widely accepted by the States and the industry alike. This is partly 
because of the IMO’s practice of conditions for the entry into force of new 
conventions wherein there is weighted representation of ship-owning nations 
through tonnage alongside the purely numerical calculation of the ratifications by 
number of States to the instrument (Rosenne, 1999, p. 264).  
When analysing the tacit acceptance procedure in terms of representation and 
voting weight in the decision making process, there is a particular word ‘or’ that 
has been used in the Articles of amendment of many of the IMO instruments, 
“……Unless it is rejected by one-third of the Contracting Parties, or the 
Contracting parties whose combined fleets represent fifty percent of world 
tonnage”.  This expression suggests that the voting of one-third of the Contracting 
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Parties is equivalent to voting of the Contracting parties constituting fifty percent 
of world tonnage. The Constitution of IMO has never mentioned the equivalency 
of tonnage with the number of Contracting Parties. Tacit acceptance procedure 
reduced the reliance on a majority of Member States to actively express their 
acceptance because silence was concurrence and thus practically lost their voting 
power. 
Open Registry 
The ship registry process has evolved over a period of last few decades as a 
commercial maritime service provided by a flag State. Ship can be registered by 
state in different ways each having its own merits and demerits depending upon 
the strictures associated with it. States which register ships in their jurisdiction 
without many of the strictures associated with closed registry system are said to 
have the Open Registry. The open registry system began to take shape during the 
period 1920 – 1950 and due to the economic benefits of the ship owners and 
maritime aspirations of developing countries soon became popular and gathered 
appreciable tonnage (Odeke, 2007, p. 68).  
Ship-owners choose the flag for their ship depending on convenience and the 
relaxation the State provides in terms of exercising its jurisdiction. They register 
their ships with the States providing open registry to avoid conditions and terms 
of employment, fiscal obligations or production factors applicable in their own 
country (Mukherjee, 1993, p. 33). Thus the registration of ship is totally driven by 
the choice of her owner. 
The States providing open registry do not have an assertion of their national 
sovereignty over it. They neither had the power nor the effective administrative 
machinery to implement and enforce national or international regulations 
(Mukherjee, 1993, p. 33). Among other benefits, one key benefit is in terms of 
appreciation in their registered tonnage and subsequently the voting weight and 
voting power in the IMO.   
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2.4. Summary 
Conditions for entry into force of an instrument actually indicate the 
representation of the voting weight negotiated by consensus for the decision to be 
taken. By agreeing to the negotiated voting weight, Member States actually 
transfer their sovereign equality to tonnage representation inequality. Member 
States (almost 65%) with limited tonnage are not given proper representation and 
therefore have no voice in IMO decision making process. The political and social 
reasons that lead to consensus voting is beyond the scope of the paper and needs 
to be further researched. The impact of foregoing their vote in IMO’s decision 
making process could be a reason for their lack of motivation to effectively 
implement IMO instruments.    
It is necessary that technical Conventions are accepted and applied by a large 
section of maritime community because standards are a way to ensure safety. This 
necessity essentially requires instruments to be applicable to as many maritime 
nations as possible for full transparency and equal maritime trade. In contrast, 
IMO adopted SOLAS Convention requiring only 25 States constituting 50 % of 
world tonnage and the subsequent Protocols requiring only 15 States with 50 % 
of world tonnage. It is quite evident that by shipping community, IMO basically 
referred to only the ship-owners.  
IMO’s tacit acceptance procedure for amendment if applied to data of 2013 would 
require only five large tonnage States possessing more than fifty percent of world 
tonnage to reject the amendment compared to 57 small States with limited tonnage 
to reject the amendment. This reflects IMO’s lopsided structure.  
Registration of a foreign ship or a national ship might be considered as a ship 
owned by a State and the State might be referred as a Ship-owning nation for that 
ship but that does not impress upon a State the required quality (Odeke, 2007, p. 
69). Thus, tonnage acquired through an open registry might not be the best 
representation of a State in IMO decision making process. In summary, tonnage 
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as the voting weight does not align with the basic fundamental philosophy, 
mission, and objectives of the IMO.  
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3. VOTING WEIGHT IN UN AND ITS SELECTED AGENCIES 
The UN basic principles as found in the UN Charter are social integration, 
sustainable development, and equality of all human beings, thus paving the 
roadway toward continued global growth. This growth will only be possible if all 
nations, irrespective of their financial status with respect to current contributions 
to the businesses in various sectors, are given fair opportunity and power to 
participate in the policy decisions. 
The common principles used in determining the voting rights in IO are the 
Westphalian model and the free market model. The basic Westphalian model 
essentially gives one vote for each Member State. The free market model suggests 
that one dollar equals one vote and is based on the principle that the voting rights 
of a Member should balance its financial contribution (Kelkar, Yadav, & 
Chaudhry, 2004, p. 739). Most of the IOs follow hierarchy of voting rules, 
indicating that States first attempt to take decisions by consensus failing which, 
they opt for formal voting rule (Payton, 2010, p. 2). However, consensus puts a 
question on whose interests it is meant to represent and/or recompense. Consensus 
in its purest form implies unanimity that is no member opposes the measure to go 
forward (Payton, 2010, p. 3). Formal consensus rules are those in which the 
charters or the rules of the agreements of the IO provide for decision-making 
through consensus (Payton, 2010, p. 5). Informal consensus rules are not drafted. 
The primary decision-making bodies in the IMF, World Bank, and the UN all rely 
on weighted system of voting, but in each of these IOs, the modal form of 
decision-making is through consensus procedures (Payton, 2010, p. 7). Inequality 
of contributions of resources leads to the inequality of voting power among States 
and this is the fundamental design feature in defining the voting weights. This 
ultimately results in inequality of power over actual decisions. Members having 
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large voting weight tend to hold disproportionately greater voting power in way 
of an additional “invisible weighting” whereas other Members might receive 
proportionately lesser voting power compared to their contributions. In some 
cases, the representing members might have no voting power at all despite holding 
significant number of votes (Leech, 2002, pp 1-2). In the general summary of 
voting power within the governance of IMF, the author, Leech, reasons that the 
basic property of the weighted voting systems is that the member’s power in 
influencing decisions is not the same as its share of votes. The weighted voting 
system is designed to give unequal power to different members but its 
implementation might result in excessive or too little equality. 
The different voting systems employed in any electoral primarily reflect the 
representation of the electoral in any decision making process. The following is a 
cursory review of the aim, objective, and work of the various international 
organizations having similar global representation much like the IMO; the UN, 
ICAO, IMF, and the WTO. The detailed comparative study to evaluate the impact 
of their voting systems on the effectiveness of their desired objectives is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, a brief introduction of the voting system and 
objectives could possibly provide a general idea of how other IOs are represented 
globally. This exploratory study will provide comprehensive understanding of the 
current practices, scope of further research and suggestions for improvements in 
the IMO decision making process. 
3.1. United Nations 
The UN founded in 1945, currently has 193 Member States. Purposes and the 
principles stated in the UN Charter dictate the mission and work of the UN. The 
UN Charter gives the UN a unique international identity allowing it to take actions 
on issues confronting humanity, such as peace and security, climate change, 
sustainable development, human rights, gender equality, food production among 
many others. As indicated by UN on their website www.un.org, the UN provides 
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a forum to all its members to express their view in its main organs like the General 
Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council and other agencies and 
therefore is a mechanism to find agreement areas and solving problems owing to 
the provision of enabling dialogue and hosting negotiations. 
As per the UN, the General Assembly is the only UN body with global 
representation by all the 193 Member States. It initiates studies and prepare 
recommendations for promoting international co-operation in political field and 
encouraging development of international law and its codification. It also 
recommends international co-operation in the economic, educational, cultural, 
social, and health fields, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
discrimination as to religion, race, sex, or language. Additionally, it recommends 
measures for the peaceful adjustment of situations which in its opinion might 
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The General 
Assembly also approves the budget of the Organization and apportions to 
Members all the expenses of the Organization.  
The Article 9 of UN Charter defines the composition of the General Assembly of 
the UN limiting it to consisting of all the UN Members with each Member having 
maximum five representatives. Each member is allowed only one vote as per 
Article 18 of the UN Charter. The official voting rule is simple majority with each 
State having one vote. In practise, it takes decisions by consensus and rarely 
requires voting (Payton, 2010, p. 2). As indicated by UN on their website 
www.un.org, decisions of the General Assembly on questions like 
recommendations relating to maintenance of international peace and security, 
elections of non-permanent members of the Security Council and members of the 
Economic and Social Council, among others including budgetary questions are 
made by two-third majority of the present voting members. Decisions on all other 
questions are made by a majority of the present voting members. Vote and 
ratification of two-third of the members of the General Assembly and all the 
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permanent members of the Security Council are required for amendment of the 
Charter as per Article 108.  
3.2. International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICAO is one of the specialized agency under the umbrella of UN. Convention on 
International Civil Aviation was enacted on December 7, 1944 and entered into 
force on April 04, 1947. As per ICAO, it currently has 191 Member States. It 
works with these Members and various other organizations related to global 
aviation to develop International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 
used by the Member States to develop their own legally enforceable regulations 
on national civil aviation. As indicated by ICAO, it has till now developed more 
than 10,000 SARPs which are included in the nineteen Annexes to the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation. Additionally, ICAO admits that these Annexes, 
SARP’s along with various policies, auditing and capacity-building endeavours 
helped it in ensuring that over hundred thousand daily flights are operated safely, 
efficiently and securely all over the world.  
The voting power system of ICAO is purely based on sovereign equality system 
of one country one vote. Item (b) of Article 91 of the Convention, specifies the 
requirement for the ratification of Convention. As per this item, the Convention 
enters into force among the twenty-six Member States on the thirtieth day after 
the twenty-sixth instrument of ratification and adherence is deposited. Article 90 
of the Convention specifies the requirements for the adoption and amendment of 
Annexes. As per item (a) of the Article 90, two-thirds of the votes of the Council 
of Annexes are required to adopt the Annex. The Annex or any amendment to 
Annex becomes effective within three months after it is submitted to the 
Contracting States or at the end of period of time as prescribed by the Council, 
unless a majority of the Contracting States register their disapproval with the 
Council during that period. 
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3.3. International Monetary Fund 
IMF, also known as the “Fund” was created in 1945 and currently has 188 
countries as its members. As indicated by IMF on their website, IMF promotes 
exchange stability and international monetary cooperation. It facilitates the 
expansion and balanced growth of international trade and help in the 
establishment of a multilateral payment systems. Additionally, it provides 
financial assistance to countries with difficulties in balance of payments enabling 
them in improving their international reserves and stabilizing their currencies.  
The two decision making bodies of the IMF are the Board of Governors and the 
Executive board. The powers of IMF are with the Board of Governors which they 
delegate to the Executive board authority to exercise except few important 
specified powers that are specifically reserved to it by Articles of agreement. The 
Executive Board is responsible for general operations of the Fund. Decision, in 
way of resolutions, are taken by a simple majority of the votes except on certain 
matters which require 85% special majority. The Executive Board like Board of 
Governors employ weighted voting system (Leech, 2002, pp. 5-6). The IMF has 
ensured that each Member State has some voting weight have having a basic quota 
for all States.  
A strong relation between a Members’ voting power and its financial contribution 
to the IMF is essential to inspire confidence among creditor Members and 
markets. The fundamental aspect of the design of the IMF voting weights is to 
allot dominant voting power to creditor nations who provide the resources. Every 
member of the IMF possess a quota in terms of US dollars which is its subscription 
to the resources of the organization and also represents its voting weight. The 
votes allotted to a Member are equal to a basic two hundred and fifty plus one vote 
for each 0.1 million dollars of quota. Thus a Member with zero quota also gets the 
basic quota of two hundred and fifty (Leech, 2002, p. 10). The quota is based on 
several financial factors. 
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Quota of a country is made up of different components within a country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) at current prices for the recent year converted at market 
exchange rates; 12-month average of gold and foreign exchange reserves, 
including reserves in the IMF; annual average of current payments for a recent 
five-year period; annual average of current receipts for a recent five-year period; 
variability of external current receipts for a recent 13-year period. The first four 
components basically reflect the economic ‘strength’ and ‘openness’ to trade of a 
member. Thus the changes in the world economy necessitates reforms in the 
governance structure of IMF (Kelkar, Yadav, & Chaudhry, 2004, pp. 732-733). 
IMF had periodically reformed its voting weight when required. 
3.4. World Trade Organization 
WTO is an Organization of 150 member governments primarily intended for 
opening trade by providing platform for governments to negotiate agreements on 
trade and to resolve disputes through operating a trade rules system. As per WTO, 
their rules support the thought of maintaining trade barriers for the protection of 
consumers and prevention of spreading of diseases. Most of its work emerges 
from the 1986-94, Uruguay round and the earlier negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT). Additionally, its documents provide the 
legal rules for international commerce and basically are contracts that bind the 
governments to keep their trade policies within negotiated limits. According to 
WTO, their aim is to keep producers of goods and services, exporters, and 
importers do their business, while allowing governments to meet environmental 
and social objectives. 
According to WTO, it continues the tradition of GATT for making decisions by 
consensus and not by voting which allows members to ensure their interests even 
if they decide to join a consensus in the global interest of the multilateral trading 
system. Thus WTO is member driven consensus-based Organization where major 
decisions are taken by the whole membership. The WTO has provisions for voting 
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in case a consensus is difficult to reach. The official voting rule of the WTO is 
simple majority with each State casting one vote. In practise, the WTO rarely takes 
decisions in this manner and instead opt for consensus (Payton, 2010, p. 2). 
According to WTO, multilateral trade agreements interpretations are adopted by 
a majority of three quarters of WTO members and the amendments to these 
agreements require approval either by all members or by a two-third majority 
depending on the type of provision concerned. 
3.5. Summary 
The international organizations like the UN, IMF, and the WTO do have weighted 
voting system. However, they opt for consensus of all Member States so that the 
decision making process do not require to undergo voting. ICAO has well defined 
structure for its Annexes which come into force by simple majority. It should be 
noted here that the ICAO has traditionally been a State based industry unlike the 
IMO which had traditionally been self-regulated private industry. 
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4. NEED FOR REFORMS IN IMO DECISION MAKING 
Growing societal contestation of various IOs in the last few decades around the 
world reflect that the IO’s right to rule based on their conformity to certain 
philosophical values and principles will not be accepted passively anymore 
(Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2014, p. 2). Organizations like the IMF has gone through 
various reforms in order to ensure legitimate representation of its Member States. 
Voting weight defined by an organization for its decision making process for an 
instrument must ensure justified representation of all the population and/or 
resources that are affected by the instrument. In the subsequent sections, tonnage 
as voting weight in IMO decision making process is discussed under various heads 
to verify if it is truly representing the purpose and objectives of IMO. Also 
discussed are few IMO instruments to understand the impact of tonnage as voting 
weight.  
4.1. Genuine link 
Genuine link between a ship and her flag has always been debated. UNCLOS 
categorically allows the flag state to “fix the conditions for the grant of nationality 
and the right to fly the flag,” which suggest that the conditions for registration of 
ship are governed by the registering state’s municipal law and not the international 
law (Allen, 2008, pp. 31-32). Shipping being global activity, national or regional 
approaches which undermine the level playing field are never seen as legitimate 
(Leeuwen, 2010, p. 55). The IMCO was meant to restrict its role to purely advisory 
and technical matters and a tacit understanding emerged that it would not exercise 
its economic mandate (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 52). Genuine link, being a non-technical 
subject could have therefore been the possible reason for IMO’s non-interference. 
However, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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(UNCTAD), through the “United Nations Convention on Conditions for 
Registration of Ships” (UNCCROS), did try to establish the genuine link between 
ship and her flag.  
 
UNCCROS, through its Article 1, had the objective of ensuring and strengthening 
the genuine link between ship and her flag. As per the Convention, UNCCROS 
established provisions for the flag States to effectively exercise its control over its 
ships relating to identification and accountability of ship-owners and operators as 
well as the technical, administrative, economic and social matters. Unfortunately, 
such a genuine link could not be established internationally as the Convention did 
not yet enter into force and is not expected. 
 
Modern ship operator consists of the beneficial owner, and the registered owner 
which is normally a brass plate company in a country not related to the ship-
owner’s location. Third party management option offers financial and legislative 
flexibility to a ship-owner as it might be difficult to prove his responsibility for 
the seaworthy condition of his ship (Karahalios, 2015, p. 28). As identified in 
VIMSAS audit report analysis, significant number of flag states do not adequately 
and efficiently discharge their obligations and responsibilities under the UNCLOS 
and IMO.  
 
Some flags allow vessel control and accountability to be blurred under byzantine 
layers of managers, corporate owners, charterers, and operators and delegate their 
authority to commercial organizations by taking formal responsibility without 
accountability. They miserably fail to investigate casualties involving their vessels 
and information is rarely communicated to IMO, as noticed in VIMSAS analysis 
report. The inadequate and ineffective enforcement practices by such flags moved 
the late Lord Donaldson to caution that flag States are “broken reed,” and cannot 
be relied upon in the coming years (Allen, 2008, pp. 44-45). Effective 
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implementation and enforcement of IMO instruments by flag States is therefore 
deteriorating.  
“The effectiveness is a measure of the relationship and congruence 
between the rule or a legal situation and social reality. It mainly refers to 
the role of factual situations in respect to the application and creation of 
national law. A legal order which does not maintain itself in to a 
relationship with social reality would be a useless abstract notion” 
(Milano, 2006, pp. 22-23).  
The States with meagre or no tonnage, in order to improve their voting power in 
the decision making process of IMO, shall be tempted to encourage ship owners 
to register their ships with them. This might lead to States providing low cost, sub-
standard and relaxed exemptions to the ship owners resulting in further 
ineffectiveness of IMO instruments. 
4.2. Cost of running the organization 
Sustainability of an international governing body, founded on collective goals 
requires funding to meet its budget in the form of financial contributions. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, representation within international organizations 
might be to tie the voting weight to the member’s financial contributions in terms 
of resources. As per Article 55 (b) of the IMO Convention, ‘the Assembly shall 
apportion the expenses among the Members in accordance with the proposals of 
the Council’. Presently, 85% of the financial contributions are calculated based on 
tonnage of the merchant fleet and the remaining 12.5% is calculated based on the 
State’s ability to pay as determined by a formula devised by the UN ("Opening up 
the Rich Man's Club," 2014, p. 13). Thus the financial contribution of a Member 
State to IMO largely depends upon its registered tonnage.  
 
Financial contributions to the IMO are utilized primarily for the operation and 
functioning of the Organization and not intended for disbursing it to the Member 
States. The IMF, unlike IMO, is an international organization that acts as a 
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financial institute. Therefore, within its Member States, it has few wealthy nations 
which contribute financially in order to stimulate the economies of those nations 
in need of support. The IMF does not only consider the GDP of the Member State, 
but there are five other financial parameters to define the quota of a Member State 
as explained in section 3.3. Therefore, a voting weight “quota”, depending on the 
financial contributions by the Member State, is justified for IMF’s representation 
and not for IMO. 
4.3. Voting power of IMO Member State 
IMO instruments generally require 25 States (15 in few cases) constituting 50% 
of world tonnage as a condition for their entry into force which decides the 
outcome of the instrument. This suggests that there are primarily two conditions 
to be met for taking the decision. Thus, voting weight in IMO decision making 
system comprises of consent by Member State and tonnage. Therefore, the voting 
power of a Member State needs to be computed using mathematical algorithms 
considering the two conditions together.  
 
A simple algorithm for calculating the Shapley-Shubik power index is formulated 
as given in Appendix 2. In summary, the Shapley-Shubik power index is a ratio 
of the number of times a member is pivotal to the total number of times all 
members together are pivotal. A pivotal member is the member in the sequential 
coalition who changes the coalition from a losing to a winning one. A sequential 
coalition is the one in which the members are listed in the order that they enter the 
coalition. There are N! Sequential coalitions containing all ‘N’ members 
("Weighted Voting Systems," n.d.) 
 
This algorithm has been formulated to identify the pivotal Member State and the 
number of times a Member State is pivotal in order to compute the Shapley-
Shubik power index. The computer program to calculate the actual Shapley-
Shubik power index for IMO Member States is beyond the scope of this paper and 
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needs further research. However, effect of the two components of consent of 
Member State and tonnage are studied separately. The consent of a Member State 
being equal for all provides equal voting power to all the Member States and the 
tonnage registered being different, the voting power is studied in detail for tonnage 
as voting weight. 
4.3.1. Percentage representation – Tonnage Vs Member States 
The understanding of the percentage variation in representation of tonnage versus 
Member States during the period 1969 – 1997 in chronological manner will throw 
light on the changes in the voting power of an IMO member State. The percentage 
variation for tonnage Vs Member State is shown in graph 4 below. The details of 
IMO Member States year of joining and the total number of IMO membership are 
given in Tables 1 and 2 of the appendix 1. In 1969, the tonnage Convention was 
adopted requiring 65% of world tonnage and the Member State requirement was 
25 out of 66 members (37.9%). The COLREG Convention adopted in 1972 
required 65% of world tonnage and the Member State requirement was 15 out of 
73 members (20.6%). MARPOL Convention required 50% of world tonnage and 
the Member State requirement was 15 out of 81 members (18.6%) when adopted 
in 1973. In 1974, the SOLAS Convention was adopted requiring 50% of world 
tonnage and the Member State requirement was 25 out of 85 members (29.5%).   
In 1978, IMO adopted three instruments, SOLAS protocol, MARPOL protocol, 
and STCW Convention requiring 15, 15, and 25 Member States respectively at an 
average of 18.33 members out of 105 members (17.5%). The tonnage requirement 
remained 50% of world tonnage for all the three instruments. In 1988, IMO 
adopted two instruments, SOLAS protocol and Load line protocol both requiring 
15 out of 129 members (11.7%) while tonnage requirement remained at 50% of 
world tonnage. Finally, in 1997, the MARPOL protocol was adopted requiring 
50% of world tonnage and the Member State requirement was 15 out of 156 
members (9.7%). 
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The graph 4 shows the variation in percentage representation of tonnage and 
Member States in IMO instruments adopted in the years 1969, 1972, 1973, 1974, 
1978, 1988, and 1997. The tonnage Convention 1966 was not included as there 
was no specific percentage of tonnage required. The graph 4 showed that the 
representation of tonnage as voting weight in IMO instruments dropped down 
from 65% in 1972 to 50% in 1973 and remained constant till 1997. The percentage 
representation of Member States in IMO instruments kept on declining from 
37.9% in 1969 to 9.7% in 1997 with a sharp increase to 29.5% in 1974. The 
declining percentage of Member States for the same percentage of world tonnage 
is a graphical evidence that the world tonnage is getting concentrated with fewer 
and fewer Member States and skewing the voting power to ship-owners.  
Graph 4: Percentage representation - Tonnage Vs Member States 
 
(Source: Data of number of Member States collected from imo.org, tabulated in 
Tables 1 and 2 of appendix 1).  
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4.3.2. Skewed representation 
Present legal regime allow ship-owners to choose flag of ship. Obviously, the 
ship-owner selects the easily accessible flag having no strictures as that of the 
closed registry. The States which have insignificant connection with vessels flying 
their flag appear to be engaged in a “race to the bottom” competition, in which, 
they offer anonymity to ship-owner and lax enforcement for ship registration. 
Owners “vote with their rudders” and change flag whenever the overall cost-
benefit analysis favours the new flag while States derive trade advantages, 
mobility, prestige, registration fees and taxes among others (Allen, 2008, pp. 48-
50). Thus the world tonnage is economically driven to the advantageous position. 
 
As noticed from graph 5 below for the data of 2013, more than 80 percent of the 
world tonnage is registered with only fifteen Member States. Also, the largest 
registered tonnage with the Member State of Panama is almost equivalent to 163 
other Member States. The largest fleets by flag of registration in 2014 are those of 
Panama, followed by Liberia, Marshall Islands, Hong Kong (China) and 
Singapore. Together, these top five registries accounted for 56.5 per cent of the 
world tonnage (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 27). The graph 5 also depicts that these five 
Member States together constituted 52.79 percent as per 2013 data, a rise of almost 
3.7 percent in one year. Therefore, the world tonnage and hence the voting weight 
is significantly skewed to very few countries leaving the rest with insignificant 
voting weight and voting power.  
  
 
 
37 
 
Graph 5: 2013 data for percentage world tonnage distribution 
 
(Source: data on tonnage from http://knoema.com/UNCTADMF2013/merchant-
fleet-by-flag-of-registration-and-by-type-of-ship-annual-1980-2013-august-
2013). 
4.3.3. Voting power computation 
The knowledge of voting power analysis provides insight to the concept of 
political representation, fairness and organizational strategy. Power indexes are 
normally considered as mathematical definitions but they ultimately depend on 
various statistical voting models (Gelman, Katz, & Tuerlinckx, 2002, p. 433). 
Voting power analysis assists in determining that the voting system allows each 
voting member some chance, however small, to affect the decisions that must be 
made. A member’s voting power is measured as fraction of the total number of 
possible voting combinations in which he can, by changing his vote, change the 
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outcome of group’s decision (Banzhaf III, 1968, pp. 809-811). Voting power 
measuring techniques are found to be useful for worldwide applications especially 
in mathematics and political science fields. 
 
Voting power measuring technique is used in Congress, stockholders’ meetings, 
the French Assembly, New York’s board of Estimate, Nassau County, New Jersey 
Senate, New York and in multi-member districts. Courts, in many cases have 
admitted computer analyses of this technique and have held the weighted voting 
plans to be unconstitutional due to their hidden inequalities (Banzhaf III, 1968, 
pp. 809-811). The voting power indices have also been used by U.S. Supreme 
Court handing down a series of “one person one vote” decisions, setting forth new 
standards of constitutional fairness for systems of electoral representation at the 
state and local levels (Burgin & Shapley, 2001, p1).  
 
The most popular indices currently in use are the Banzhaf – Coleman (Banzhaf, 
1965; 1968; Coleman, 1971) and Shapley – Shubik (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). 
The Banzhaf – Coleman index emerged from the legislature practice and the 
Shapley – Shubik index was introduced as a specialized “Shapley value” (Shapley, 
1953) considered as the most useful tools in game theory (Burgin & Shapley, 
2001, p1). These indices are briefly introduced to understand the significance of 
voting weight on voting power. 
 
The non-normalised Banzhaf index for a member is the proportion of votes which 
are its swings and measures the absolute power of the member as a probability. It 
shows the relative voting power of different members but does not provide direct 
interpretation of power distribution. The normalised version of the Banzhaf index 
is used for that purpose. Normalised Banzhaf index is the ratio of number of a 
members swings to the total number of swings for all members. It could be 
interpreted as the members’ share of power in the power of all members to 
influence the outcome by means of swing. This index is normalised to sum to 1 
 
 
39 
 
for all Members. It provides a measure of the relative power of each Member for 
a given defined quota (Leech, 2002, pp 13-19). Hence, it is an easy algorithm to 
check the distribution of voting power of a member.  
 
Coleman’s power of a member to prevent action is its potential to block a decision 
by means of a swing. It is the proportion of outcomes with winning coalitions that 
are also swings for the member, and hence is the capacity of the member to change 
a winning vote into a losing one. Coleman’s power of a Member to initiate action 
is the number of swings relative to the total number of voting outcomes that do 
not have a winning coalition. This index measures the potential of the member to 
swing a losing coalition to winning coalition. Coleman’s indices of power to 
prevent action and power to initiate action provide appreciable understanding of 
the choice of quota on the power to act (Leech, 2002, pp 13-19). Coleman’s 
indices therefore are helpful in understanding reasons for members not being able 
to propose ideas and understanding how few members could prevent any action 
by the voting body.  
 
The various programmes available for computing the power indices are the 
ipdirect, ipgenf, ipmmle, ipnice, ssdirect, ssgenf, ssmmle, ssocean among many 
others. The paper intends to use the ipmmle program as it gives four different 
indices to be compared with in order to evaluate the voting power distribution. 
The ipmmle program calculates the Banzhaf, Penrose and Colemen indices by 
Leech’s modification of Owen’s multilinear approximation method. This 
algorithm can comfortably handle large number of members and votes in a body 
with acceptable approximation, for which the exact methods are not suitable 
("Computer Algorithms for Voting Power Analysis," n.d., ipmmle). These 
algorithms could be readily used due to their availability, however, different 
algorithms could be designed and voting power index computed. 
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In order to study the effect of tonnage as voting weight on the voting power of a 
Member State, the data for flag wise tonnage for the year 2013 was tabulated in 
reducing order of tonnage as given in Table 3 of appendix 1 and was considered 
to compute the various power indices using ipmmle program. Voting weight was 
then calculated using the percentage of world tonnage the Member State holds. 
The ipmmle program also requires quota (voting weight, tonnage in our case) to 
be defined which was considered to be 50 as generally required by IMO 
instrument. In addition, number of major Member States were considered to be 6 
as they had 5% or more of the world total tonnage leaving 172 as other Member 
States. Absolute Banzhaf index (Penrose index), Normalized Banzhaf index, 
Coleman’s power to prevent action, and Coleman’s power to initiate action were 
then obtained using the ipmmle program and tabulated as given in Table 4 of 
appendix 1.  
 
A graph was drawn for the various power indices for all the Member States in 
order to interpret their voting power variation. The graph showed considerable 
variation for the first 15 Member States beyond which there was no significant 
difference noticed. Therefore, the relevant section of the graph for the top 25 
countries was considered for further interpretation as shown in graph 6 below. 
 
The graph 6 shows that Panama holding approximately 20.87% of world tonnage 
enjoys the maximum voting power. Also it has tremendous power to initiate and 
prevent any actions taken by the IMO as reflected from the Coleman’s curves for 
power to initiate and power to prevent actions in IMO decision making process. 
Liberia, with 11.64% of world tonnage enjoys considerably lesser voting power 
than Panama, followed by Marshall Islands, China (Hong Kong SAR), Singapore, 
and Bahamas. Bahamas which is 6th ranked holds just 5% of world tonnage. China 
Malta, Greece, and United Kingdom which are ranked 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 
respectively do enjoy some voting power and the Coleman’s curve indicate that 
these countries do have power to initiate and prevent actions of IMO instruments. 
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Cyprus, Italy, Norway, Japan, Germany, Denmark, Bermuda, United states, 
Korea, Antigua and Barbuda, and Indonesia enjoy dispersed insignificant voting 
power to initiate and prevent actions resulting from IMO instruments. Indonesia 
stands 21st with just 1 % of world tonnage. India and remaining 156 Member 
States have almost zero voting power to initiate or prevent any decisions taken by 
IMO through its instruments.   
Graph 6: Various power indices of Member States based on tonnage 
registered 
 
(Source: data on tonnage from http://knoema.com/UNCTADMF2013/merchant-
fleet-by-flag-of-registration-and-by-type-of-ship-annual-1980-2013-august-2013) 
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The selected flag wise percentage of world tonnage as per the data of 2014 was 
considered for evaluating voting power of a coalition like the EU as shown in 
Table 5 of appendix 1. Voting power was then computed and tabulated in Table 6 
of appendix 1. Graph 7 below shows the effect of coalition power. Voting power 
indices computation was based on considering seven major players and thirty-
three others. The EU having 27 Member States collectively becomes a powerful 
coalition in the IMO not only with respect to tonnage as voting weight but with 
27 Member States, it is able to make or block any decisions taken in IMO. The 
IMO requirement of normally having 25 Member States thus makes the EU 
coalition virtually the most powerful player of the game. This is evident from the 
EU’s Coleman’s power to prevent action and Coleman’s power to initiate action 
as shown in graph 7 below.  
Graph 7: Coalition power of the European Union 
 
(Source: Data for flag wise registered tonnage for the year 2014 taken from - 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2
30408/shipping-fleet-tech-note.pdf) 
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The IMO needs to increase the number of representing Member States to a much 
higher than 25 Member States in order to avoid allocating entire power to a 
particular coalition like the EU. The other Member States might have to either 
form a separate maritime organization or form equally powerful coalitions. Such 
divisions within the IMO Member States is detrimental to the objective of IMO to 
ensure proper facilitation among Member States. The following paragraphs 
discuss the effect of tonnage as a voting weight in conditions for entry into force 
of international instruments like the SAR, UNCROSS, and BWM.  
 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 1979 
 
The Article 98 of UNCLOS makes it mandatory for the State requiring master of 
its ship to provide assistance to any person in distress at sea. It also makes it 
mandatory for the coastal State to establish, operate and maintain adequate and 
effective search and rescue service relating to safety at sea and cooperate with 
neighbouring States by mutual agreements.  
SAR Convention, Article V required consent only from 15 Member States to enter 
into force. In the absence of tonnage, this Convention required voting using 
sovereign equality of One Member State – One Vote. Surprisingly, the SAR 
Convention considered the obligations and responsibilities of coastal States in 
detail whereas it does not categorically require the State to direct the master of its 
ship to provide assistance to the distressed person. On analysis, it gives an 
impression that the drafters of the Convention left the first part of Article 98 of 
UNCLOS for the State’s interpretation while strengthening the second part 
requiring obligations and responsibilities of the coastal State. Ship-owners stayed 
away from decision making process and their interest was protected by having a 
provision to avoid delay to the ship rendering assistance. The SAR Convention 
comes with a huge cost to the Member State which is not shared by any other 
maritime stakeholder.  
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United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1986 
 
UNCCROS 1986, was adopted through UNCTAD in relation to the definition and 
enhancement of the “genuine link” between the vessel and the registration 
country. UNCCROS, also took cognizance of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas and the UNCLOS, of the duties of the flag State in its jurisdiction to 
effectively exercise control over its ships. UNCCROS, has not yet entered into 
force and additionally, its success is considered limited owing to ratification by 
only few States (Varotsi, 2008, p. 18).  
UNCCROS, Article 19 required forty Contracting Parties constituting 25 percent 
of world tonnage to enter into force. The maritime industry was aware that getting 
consent from larger number of States is not only a herculean task but delays the 
entry into force considerably still they chose to increase the consent from twenty-
five Member States to forty. To evaluate the voting power of Member States, the 
data for the top twenty-six Member States as per their registered tonnage for the 
year 2013 is considered and voting power computed using ipmmle algorithm. The 
computed voting power indices are tabulated in Table 7 of appendix 1. Six major 
players and 172 others for the required majority quota of 25 percent as the tonnage 
voting weight was considered. Absolute Banzhaf index, Coleman’s power to 
prevent action and Coleman’s power to initiate actions was analysed from the 
graph 8 below. 
 
 
45 
 
Graph 8: 2013 data, voting power distribution for UNCCROS 
 
(Source: data on tonnage from http://knoema.com/UNCTADMF2013/merchant-
fleet-by-flag-of-registration-and-by-type-of-ship-annual-1980-2013-august-2013) 
As noticed from the graph 6, the top five Member States had tremendous power 
to initiate action and power to prevent action. Unfortunately, all these Member 
States are proponents of open registry. UNCCROS, being adopted to overcome 
the problems of open registry had to meet the fate that it can never enter into force. 
It is quite evident that the voting weight for the Convention were purposely 
intended for not bringing the Convention into force. The proponents of the 
Convention could not possibly understand the significance of tonnage and higher 
number of Member State requirement as voting weight on their voting power. 
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International convention for the control and management of ship’s ballast 
water and sediments (BWM Convention), 2004 
 
The Article 196(1) of the UNCLOS makes it mandatory for the States “To take 
all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment resulting from the use of technologies under their jurisdiction or 
control, or the intentional or accidental introduction of species, alien or new, to a 
particular part of the marine environment, which may cause significant and 
harmful changes thereto.” 
 
Recalling this and the objectives of the 1992 Convention on Biological diversity 
and upon request from 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development for adopting appropriate rules on discharge of ballast water, the 
IMO adopted the BWM Convention. 
 
BWM Convention, Article 18 required thirty Member States constituting 35 
percent of world tonnage to enter into force. As per IMO, currently, the 
Convention got consent from forty-four Member States constituting 32.86 percent 
of world’s gross tonnage. The requirement for the number of States of thirty is 
met however, the condition for tonnage is not. In order to evaluate voting power 
of Member States, the top thirty Member States as per their registered tonnage for 
the year 2013 is considered and voting power computed using ipmmle algorithm. 
The computed voting power indices are tabulated in Table 8 of appendix 1. Six 
major players and 172 others for the required majority quota of 35 percent as the 
tonnage voting weight was considered. Absolute Banzhaf index, Coleman’s 
power to prevent action and Coleman’s power to initiate actions were analysed 
from the graph 9 given below. 
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Graph 9: 2013 data, voting power distribution for BWM 
 
(Source: data on tonnage from http://knoema.com/UNCTADMF2013/merchant-
fleet-by-flag-of-registration-and-by-type-of-ship-annual-1980-2013-august-2013) 
The graph 9 above shows that only eleven Member States with the top registered 
tonnage had the potential voting power to initiate action and power to prevent 
action while rest of the world maritime nations had practically no power in 
decision making of BWM Convention. It has been over a decade now and still the 
Convention has not entered into force. MARPOL Convention required only 15 
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Member States constituting 50 percent of world gross tonnage to enter into force 
compared to the requirement of 30 Member States constituting 35 percent of world 
gross tonnage for BWM.  
 
This is an evidence that the ship-owners and so the IMO is driven by the media 
pressure and do not exhibit their true concern for the marine pollution. Doubling 
the requirement of Consent from Member states, a known difficult task and 
reducing the requirement for tonnage by 30 percent suggests that the intention of 
the voting body was to delay the Convention to probably a stage where it no more 
enters into force. However, contrary to the probable assumptions made, the 
requirement of consent of Member States was met and the requirement for tonnage 
remains.  
4.4. Generally accepted international standards 
UNCLOS and the 1958 Convention on the High Seas requires the Contracting 
Parties to conform to the “Generally Accepted International Standards” (GAIS) 
(Allen, 2008, p. 34). The basic principles of treaty law suggest that regulations that 
become part of a treaty cannot be considered unilaterally and needs to be associated 
with the port and coastal States obligations. Else, the treaty law structure of 
UNCLOS and IMO Conventions would break resulting in legal uncertainty 
(Bazan, 1999, p. 281). This reflect the interrelation between the various obligations 
and responsibilities of a Member State as flag State, Coastal State and Port State. 
 
IMO has gained the international recognition for the development of maritime 
standards of world-wide applicability and so the rules and standards developed by 
IMO are generally considered as internationally accepted (Allen, 2008, pp. 28-29). 
UNCLOS thus effectively universalized the IMO Conventions for all its 
Contracting Parties and requires them to enforce the IMO Conventions irrespective 
to whether they are Party to them or not (Allen, 2008, p. 34).  
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Some commentators opine that a legal act needs to be unanimously adopted to 
clarify the term “generally accepted” while it is sensible to assume that non-
binding IMO instruments sufficiently meet the criterion if adopted by an 
overwhelming majority. Thus, GAIS cover international treaties that gained 
widespread ratification, IMO Conventions that entered into force, and IMO’s non-
binding decisions adopted by great majority (Kachel, 2006, p. 40). 
In case of the “Nairobi Wreck Convention, 2007”, IMO had to facilitate 
development of the Convention requiring only ten ratifications, and no minimum 
tonnage. If IMO continues to bow to such pressures, its law-making reputation 
and objective to achieve “universal and uniform application” of its instruments 
will be at stake (Allen, 2008, pp. 28-29). The current legal matrix of GAIS 
developed by the member States of the IMO provides the uniformity for maritime 
sector. The evidence for the “general acceptance” is established by the universal 
ratification of the principal IMO instruments on safety and pollution prevention 
Conventions like the SOLAS and MARPOL (Allen, 2008, pp. 29-30). The actual 
reason for universal acceptance might be the economic factors of the State. 
 
IMO rules and standards become GAIS when the relevant Convention enters into 
force. If the Conventions enter into force by acceptance of only 25 or 15 of its 
Member States constituting 50% of world tonnage, it does not qualify to be GAIS. 
This is firstly because, the conditions for entry into force does not represent 
overwhelming majority. Secondly, it is the number of ratifications at the time of 
entry into force that needs to be taken into account and not the number of 
ratifications after a considerable period has passed. 
4.5. Maritime stakeholders 
The stakeholders play the most important role in any decision making process. 
The maritime industry constitutes of various stakeholders that are affected by IMO 
instruments. Some of the stakeholders of the maritime industry are the ship-
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owners, charterers, ship operators, ship builders, ports, marine equipment 
manufacturers, cargo owners, Sustainable shipping coalitions,  Classification 
societies, Various agents and suppliers, investors, banks and insurers, Local 
communities, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Academia, Coastal 
population, Public, Government and regulators, Unions, and employees. In 
addition, there are the most important human element of the Seafarers, Maritime 
Institutes, Surveyors and the list goes on.  
 
Depending on various other factors like the national regulations of a State, some 
of the maritime stakeholders are private and some are part of the State. Within the 
stakeholders, there are millions of people getting affected through coastal 
population, passengers, seafarers, and surveyors, workforce involved in ship-
building and ship-repair activities and many more. Together they constitute the 
maritime industry of a State.  
International NGOs representing the different maritime stakeholders in IMO 
deliberations are given the observer status. IMO involves the industry associations 
in the negotiations primarily because of their expertise input. The NGO’s by 
themselves do not have the right of voting for the IMO instruments and therefore 
they lobby and participate in regulatory affairs in IMO conferences in order to 
safeguard their own interest. The environmental NGOs have been involved in the 
global environmental governance of shipping and have been pressurising the 
governments to take action against oil pollution from shipping. United Kingdom 
was under pressure to adopt unilateral regulations by the Advisory Committee on 
the Prevention of Oil Pollution which was established in 1952 (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 
56). There have been representation in IMO by the shipping industry too.  
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) represented interests of the ship owners 
at IMCO since 1958. Ship owner’s interest is to develop steering mechanisms 
through IMO because of their apprehensions regarding fragmented regulations on 
the national level. Oil companies owning tankers and International Association of 
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Tanker Owners (Intertanko) were also involved as tankers have been major cause 
for oil pollution. Intertanko did not have observer status at IMO and so allied with 
ICS. Most of these industry representatives were caught between the threat of 
unilateral regulations and their own interest of having minimum regulations. 
Contrary to the environmental NGOs, the oil companies and tanker owners 
lobbied both at domestic and international level (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 56). Thus, 
shipping industry which intended to be self-regulated slowly moved to be 
internationally regulated for safety and pollution prevention. 
Private maritime stakeholders implement maritime regulations in their policies 
only when they are benefitted by such regulations. Private stakeholders therefore 
in some cases, face risk of conflicts of interest in controlling clients versus 
retaining their market share. Interests of private stakeholders is much narrower 
than that of the State’s (Karahalios, 2015, p. 29). States are the key players for 
adopting an IMO regulation and incorporating it into their national law and 
thereby making it mandatory for the other stakeholders within its jurisdiction. 
Most of the stakeholders including the State face difficulties and new challenges 
managing a small change in the existing international regulatory regime. 
Therefore, the stakeholder either tries to limit or avoid the excessive burden of the 
changes in regulations (Karahalios, 2015, pp. 13-20). The cost including the social 
cost involved in implementing an IMO regulation is to be borne by the affected 
stakeholders which eventually filters down to the citizens of the State for which 
the State is responsible. 
Flag State, by virtue of its jurisdiction over its ships has the responsibility of 
implementation and compliance of international standards (Leeuwen, 2010, p. 
56). Despite its importance, it is not sufficiently represented in the IMO decision 
making. The ship-owner is empowered through tonnage as the voting weight and 
voting power and also through ICS having observer status. Thus the rules and 
regulations developed by IMO primarily protects the interests of the ship-owners 
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and not the maritime industry and this does not necessarily help in achieving its 
objectives in true sense.  
4.6. Lack of motivation 
Every State has developed an economy with a dependence on sea trade due to their 
geo-political position. Therefore, each State protects its economy by adopting 
regulations that will not be in conflict with its industrial economic activities like 
imports and exports of cargoes by sea, ship ownership, shipyards, ports, and 
seafarers’ rights. Thus, it is the economic interest that determines the willingness 
of a State to adopt a maritime regulation (Karahalios, 2015, p. 23). These States 
tend to get themselves into the evasive and compliance culture relating to the 
compliance with new regulations. The evasive and compliance culture have truly 
been recognized by the maritime industry as a cancer for the safety and pollution 
prevention objective of IMO. 
 
“How could a system of norms be compelling for states, if there did not 
exist any enforcement agency and compulsory jurisdiction? The States 
would follow rules of international law only as long as their self-interest 
was pursued. Every norm obliging them to do something contrary to their 
political interest would be ignored. It could be concluded that such a thing 
called ‘International law’ did not exist, and if a set of rules existed, they 
are only processes of secondary importance” (Milano, 2006, p. 28).  
 
Compliance of IMO instruments is best verified during PSC inspections due to the 
“No favourable treatment” clause which can be found in most of the IMO 
instruments. Therefore the IMO objectives of safety and pollution prevention can 
be effectively achieved mostly for the vessels on international trade touching 
foreign ports. Safety and pollution prevention of coastal vessels operating in 
coastal waters is totally the responsibility of the flag states. PSC regimes strictness 
might motivate flags to concentrate on their foreign going vessels for effective 
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implementation of IMO instruments but they might take it easy for their own 
coastal vessels which effectively does not contribute to IMO’s objective. 
 
Tonnage, as voting weight IMO instrument’s decision making process could be a 
reason for Member States with meagre or no tonnage to abstain from active 
participation  in the IMO deliberations. Lack of representation and active 
participation could result in lack of motivation for most of the Member States. The 
States which are improperly represented may feel less empowered to effect change 
and may therefore lack motivation to effectively implement IMO instruments 
within their jurisdiction.  
4.7. Summary 
 
Tonnage, being the voting weight in IMO’s decision making process, needs to be 
studied in terms of its distribution within its Member States in order to study the 
appropriateness of Member States representation. The absence of international 
recognition for the genuine link (ships to flag) poses the biggest challenge for 
tonnage being considered as the voting weight. Severing the accountability link 
between government and citizenry undermines the principle of democratic 
representation applied to international organizations (Payton, 2010, p. 10). 
Financial contribution to IMO’s budget, based on tonnage factors, needs to be 
investigated as this contribution does not truly qualify for voting weight.  
The paper does not intend to go into details of what shall be the best option to 
decide the financial contribution of a Member State. However, as the Council 
recommends the IMO budget and apportion within the Member States, it should 
consider that the financial contribution is indirectly affecting the voting weight 
and voting power of the Member State. Constitutional change is therefore 
definitely suggested to ensure that only the tonnage could not be the determining 
criteria for contribution to the IMO as it gives an opportunity for selected 
stakeholder to claim power over the entire maritime industry of the world.  
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Skewed representation suggests that the tonnage has significantly monopolised 
the voting weight. Lack of representation and participation from low-tonnage 
States will continue if the same methodology, for bringing an IMO instrument into 
force, is adopted. IMO must consider the game-theoretic approach to decide 
appropriate voting weights that will ensure better representation of Member States 
for effective implementation of its instruments. The ‘voting weight majority’ 
requirement could be altered by an institution to its advantage if it truly intends to 
force a decision. Unless a comprehensive mathematical analysis is carried out and 
quota justified, the one Member – one vote methodology provides the quick 
answer for universally accepted and justified majority rule. This would also give 
IMO the true recognition as an international organization for maritime industry.  
Ship-owners’ tonnage has been playing a powerful role owing to its voting power 
in the decision making process of IMO. Objectives of IMO could not be 
effectively achieved unless it meets the ship-owners desires and this puts IMO in 
a precarious situation. The inability of IMO to bring into force the Convention on 
BWM, over 10 years, is the best example to understand the interpretation of the 
Coleman’s power to prevent action of some Member States. 
 
The overall ideology for safety onboard ships, due to Titanic, or the subsequent 
pollution Conventions, due to the Torrey Canyon, had been based on the minimum 
requirements for shipboard practices and therefore tonnage could have been the 
most important parameter to ensure extensive compliance all across the world. 
This argument justifies the consideration of tonnage as the voting weight in IMO 
decision making process. However, over a period of time almost four decades 
since SOLAS first came into force, there have been significant additional 
requirements placed on the State pertaining to duties, obligations and 
responsibilities. Therefore the State, as a critical stake holder, should be 
appropriately represented. 
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The one and only solution that could be visualized to represent all the maritime 
stakeholders is the State itself and not the just one element of shipping. Also, being 
a signatory to UNCLOS, a Member State’s position as the topmost stakeholder 
and is overall responsible for the maritime operations within its jurisdiction cannot 
be argued. Interestingly, most of the IMO instruments were basically adopted and 
entered into force through the voting system that required tonnage as the voting 
weight. This means that the authority to implement and enforce various IMO 
instruments by the State comes from the influence of ship-owners themselves. In 
this case, it is surprising to realize that a State must then turn around and enforce 
the requirements on those ship-owners. 
Ironically, IMO went through structural changes from 1975 to 1982 in order to 
reflect internationalized character, but the steady drop in percentage 
representation of Member States in the decision making process suggest that the 
IMO remained a ship-owners organization. Therefore, taking cognizance of the 
evaluated facts, it is long overdue that IMO reforms the voting weight 
requirements within its decision making process to truly represent an international 
organization for the global maritime industry. 
What should then be the voting weight that would best represent a Member State 
in IMO instrument decision making process? IMO, as an international 
organization that deals with technical aspects of shipping, cannot isolate itself 
from addressing social issues. As Steven Bernstein conclude, “The dominant 
answer to what legitimacy requires in global governance is democracy.” 
(Bernstein, 2011, p. 21). Democracy comes through justified representation. 
 A review of the four pillars of the IMO; SOLAS, MARPOL, Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC), and STCW, gives an overall idea of what could have been the 
best representation for these pillars though it could be interpreted in many other 
ways. SOLAS, being an instrument for safety of life at sea, could have been best 
represented by tonnage, passenger carriage, and seafarers. MARPOL, dealing 
with marine pollution could have been represented by tonnage related to tankers 
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and coastal population. STCW Convention purely deals with seafarers’ 
qualifications and training and should be represented by seafarers. Unfortunately, 
most of the flag administrations are just recognizing certificates issued by other 
flags. MLC Convention dealt with seafarers’ welfare and so the representation 
should have also been seafarers. 
Thus, there is a need to look at the topic in a fresh fashion. A paradigm shift is 
required from recognizing just one maritime stakeholder’s interest, the ship-
owner, to the entire maritime community. This shall motivate States to develop 
their maritime industry as a whole and enjoy better representation within the IMO. 
Increased representation of Member States in bringing an IMO instrument in to 
force will lead to ownership of their decisions which will eventually percolate into 
effective implementation too. The paper intends to introduce the concept of goal-
based ‘Fair Weight’ that would be a collective weight of the various classifiers 
that influence the instrument for which the decision needs to be taken. This ‘Fair 
Weight’ could then be utilized for Member States’ voting weight. The next chapter 
deals with the concept of ‘Fair Weight’ and how it could be evaluated in the 
simplest form for ensuring better representation of the Member States. 
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5. ‘FAIR WEIGHT’ 
The need to improve representation in the decision making process paves the way 
to evaluate various possible options. The two important questions that need to be 
answered are: who is meant to be represented and what is the nature of 
representation (Payton, 2010, p. 8). The voting systems could be broadly classified 
in two ways: sovereign equality and equal representation. These two systems are 
discussed briefly in the following sections. 
5.1. Sovereign equality 
 
International organizations favoured equality in voting power based upon the one 
state, one vote principle. The San Francisco and Bretton Woods conferences 
established new precedents in international decision-making which explicitly 
acknowledged that voting power should be directly related to interest and 
influence primarily than unnecessarily emphasizing the political equality of 
States. Legal scholars have argued that States are a sovereign, cohesive legal entity 
and should be represented in international organizations in this unitary nature. 
However, this claim neglects the principal-agent relationship that lies at the heart 
of theories of representation (Payton, 2010, pp. 6-8). Also, representation on the 
basis of sovereign equality presents complicated challenges as the number of 
actors in the system increases along with the heterogeneity of their preferences 
(Payton, 2010, pp. 10-11). 
In case of IMO, the Member states who contribute to the maritime industry and 
the objectives of IMO might be discouraged as there positive intentions would 
still require acceptance from those maritime nations that do not contribute. Also, 
historically, IMO had been suffering delays in decision making due to the 
requirement of consent by large number of Member States leading to stalemate 
situations. As a decision making body, this methodology of majority voting will 
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provide IMO the maximum power to act. However, the advantages of equality of 
representation outweigh the advantages of sovereign equality. 
5.2. Equal representation 
The principle of equality of representation primarily means weighted voting 
systems in which the weightage is in terms of population and/or resources. The 
contemporary democratic theory relates to representation that focuses on the 
fairness of electoral representation (Payton, 2010, pp. 7-8).  Weighted voting and 
majority requirements are procedures of collective decision adopted by financial 
Organizations to protect those who contribute the most to their funding from a 
progressive redistribution toward the median voter observed in one man one vote 
international organizations.  
Voting power and not the voting weight influences the voting outcomes and 
therefore weight needs to be allocated to members to bring about a voting power 
distribution which protects larger contributors from exploitation of their 
contributions by coalition of less worthy contributors (Hagot & Lemennicier, 
2015, pp. 267-268). IMO utilizes tonnage as voting weight probably considering 
the tonnage as a resource of the nation. In relation to the maritime industry, only 
tonnage could not be the sole voting weight to be representing State. The goal 
based voting weight is introduced to appropriately represent the States’ voting 
weight for the decision making of a proposed IMO instrument.  
5.3. ‘Fair Weight’ – Goal-based voting weight 
Goal-based voting weight is the voting weight that would best define the goal that 
is the instrument for which the decision is to be taken. IMO lacks the enforcement 
power without which its objectives cannot be effectively achieved unless the 
Member States cooperate. Thus the performance of IMO entirely depend upon the 
performance of its Member States in effectively implementing the IMO 
instruments. IMO has specific purpose and objectives and in order to be a 
successful organization and longevity, it must ensure that its efforts are towards 
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strengthening its very existence. It is thus imperative for the IMO to protect the 
interest of those who contribute most to the organizations objectives and for that 
reason, the Organization should consider judiciously the voting weight in its 
decision making process.  
The weighted voting system of IMO must ensure that the weights are defined in a 
manner that the actual contributors for its objective are not deprived of voting 
power. The weight that will protect the interest of the actual contributors to the 
world maritime industry and motivate others to contribute in a positive manner 
through effective representation is termed in this paper as the ‘Fair Weight’. Goal 
based voting weight based on the performance of the Member States within the 
identified classifiers is expected to provide the best possible solution. The 
following advantages of the goal based voting weight are envisaged.  
1. Every Member State gets a chance to get the voting weight and the voting 
power. 
2. The goal based voting weight will result in “race to top” ideology than “race 
to bottom”. 
3. Member State desiring to possess voting power would concentrate more on 
their own performance and try to improvise on their weak areas. This way an 
overall improvement is expected. 
4. Member States are expected to participate better with this system as they will 
have some say in the IMO deliberations and this will motivate them further. 
In addition, Member States which contribute to the maritime industry in true 
sense will be further motivated to perform better. 
5. Apprehensions about IMO’s bias towards the tonnage or the ship-owners will 
be permanently eliminated. 
6. Ship-owners who would like to retain their power within the IMO will tend to 
eventually get polarised towards better performing Member States. 
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7. Member States will derive their authority through their own performance and 
not through ship-owners thereby resulting in better implementation and 
enforcement. 
8. The world is heading towards goal based methodologies in all sectors. IMO 
will be the flag runner of the methodology among the international 
organizations. 
5.4. ‘Fair Weight’ computation 
Maritime industry consists of many stakeholders / services / areas and so on. Let 
us call these as classifiers for simplicity. For any given instrument like 
Convention, Amendments, Regulations, first of all identify all the relevant and 
major classifiers that could be affected by the proposed instrument. Let these 
classifiers be called x1, x2, ….xx. So that there are total ‘X’ classifiers. These ‘X’ 
classifiers might have different levels of importance and could be weighted 
accordingly. However, for simplicity, let us say they have equal weights of 100 
for each classifier. Therefore, the total number of weights available are 100X. Let 
there be ‘N’ Member States. Next, for each classifier ‘X’ we find the performance 
of all the ‘N’ Member States as percentage of the total performance of all States.  
Thus the weight of 100 for each classifier will get divided into all the Member 
States depending on their relative performance compared to the other States for 
that classifier. All such percentages of relative performance for all classifiers are 
then summed up to get the ‘Fair Weight’ ‘w’ of the Member State. Thus for ‘N’ 
Member States, the total ‘Fair Weight’’s would be w1, w2, w3,………, wn such 
that ∑wn = 100X (for all n=1 to n). 
5.4.1. Classifier selection 
Classifier selection will define the voting weight of the Member State for the 
proposed instrument. The proposed instrument needs to be thoroughly studied in 
order to identify the affected maritime stakeholders or areas, or services, 
obligations, responsibilities, and so on. Most relevant classifiers are then chosen 
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and divided into various components which are then quantified in order to evaluate 
the performance of the Member State for the chosen classifier. Components 
chosen could give positive indicators for good performance and negative 
indicators for failure.  
Selection of classifier will depend upon the proposed IMO instrument. Major 
classifiers could be but not limited to are the common areas (defined as in III 
code), flag State responsibilities and obligations, coastal State responsibilities and 
obligations, Port State responsibilities and obligations, passengers, tonnage, 
seafarers, Search and Rescue capabilities, Hydrographic surveys, Casualty 
investigations, Survey and certification, Research and Development, maritime 
technology, port facilities and management, Shipyards, Reporting to IMO, and so 
on. Some classifiers could be coupled together, like the performance in IAMSAS 
audit can directly be used for performance of State in common areas, and flag, 
coastal, port State responsibilities and obligations. The requirements for the 
proper functioning and operation of the proposed voting system are described in 
the following paragraph.  
5.4.2. Quota selection 
Quota, the majority requirement, for the decision to be taken, is the defined 
percentage of the total weight. Slight change in the required quota affects the 
voting power of the voting member significantly. It is important to understand the 
concept Coleman’s power to act index as an important aspect of voting system. 
The Coleman’s power to act is defined for the body itself (IMO in our case) as the 
ease with which members’ interests in a vote can be converted into actual 
decisions and is evaluated as the proportion of all the theoretically possible 
outcomes that results in a decision. The Coleman’s power to act is defined for the 
body itself as the ease with which members’ interests in a vote can be translated 
into actual decisions. It is measured as the proportion of all the theoretically 
possible outcomes that give rise to a decision (Leech, 2002, p. 17).  
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Study of the effect of majority requirement on power index carried out for IMF 
reflects that the power to act of the body reduces drastically with the increase in 
the majority requirement, and is almost negligible beyond 75%. The study 
concluded that the practise of requiring special majorities of 85% for few IMF 
decisions make it relatively ineffective as a democratic decision making body 
(Leech, 2002, p. 22). Majority requirement quota of 50% for the IMO instruments 
is recommended for IMO decision making process for it to be more effective as a 
body.  
5.4.3. Requirement 
The above mentioned classifiers could be quantified for ‘Fair Weight’ 
computation in two different ways. One which are quantifiable based on the 
regular data available and are dynamic in character and the other which are not 
dynamic and required to be quantified based on an audit / inspection to be carried 
out for verification. The classifiers requiring data could be maintained as a 
database and updated regularly. IMSAS could be utilized to gather audit results 
for the relevant classifiers. Weights evaluated for the classifiers justify the 
performance of Member States for the considered classifier. The overall ‘Fair 
Weights’ could be tabulated for all Member States to give Maritime Performance 
Index for the Member State. The paper intends to describe a simple procedure for 
evaluating the ‘Fair Weight’ for selected classifiers like the IMSAS audit results, 
tonnage, seafarers and Search and Rescue. The Member State’s performance for 
other classifiers could be evaluated on similar lines and additional conditions 
could be introduced if relevant. 
5.5. Classifier weight computation examples 
5.5.1. IMSAS audit results 
As per IMO, Resolution A. 1067(28), the IMSAS audit team gives the Member 
state the audit results along with the Observations and/or Findings if applicable. 
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As defined in the Resolution, “Observation is a statement of fact substantiated by 
objective evidence, relating to a non-mandatory provision of the audit standard” 
and “Finding is a situation where objective evidence indicates the non-compliance 
with a mandatory requirement contained in an IMO instrument or in the audit 
standard”. 
 
The III Code, as an Annex to the IMO Resolution A. 1070(28), covers the 
obligations and responsibilities of a State under four major areas. These are the 
Common areas, Flag States, Coastal States and Port States. These areas include 
altogether 63 items that are relevant to verify the compliance of a State with the 
relevant IMO instruments. IMO further developed IMO circular Letter No. 3425, 
dated 5 Dec 2013, “Auditor’s Manual for the IMO Member State Audit Scheme” 
to provide guidelines for the auditors. The Annex 2 of the Auditor’s manual 
provides details on assessment of areas related to the III Code which is used as a 
verification index for the compliance achieved against each item of the III Code 
by the Member State. The verification index thus represents the State’s 
performance with respect to the compliance of IMO instruments and could be used 
directly to evaluate the State’s performance as a maritime State.  
 
The paper intends to use the verification index of IMSAS audit as a classifier to 
evaluate the performance of the State as a maritime nation. In order to do so, the 
author intends to quantify the verification index. The answers to various items of 
the Code are ‘Not Applicable’ if not relevant to the State, ‘YES’ if the State 
complies with the item, and ‘Observation’ or a ‘Finding’, depending on severity, 
if a State is not fully complying with the requirements of the defined item. In order 
to quantify these indices, the author intends to utilize the following methodology. 
 
The items which are ‘Not applicable’ to a State are not considered for its 
performance evaluation. Let ‘YES’, ‘Observation’, and ‘Finding’ be denoted by 
‘Y’, ‘O’, and ‘F’ respectively. Now we allot one point for every ‘Y’ so that the 
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total points for ‘Y’ answers, (VY) is equal to the number of ‘Y’ answers. The 
number of ‘Observations’ that a State gets may vary significantly and therefore 
needs to be defined with a band-width. The number of ‘O’ a State gets is compared 
with half of the world average observations. Thus two band-widths are considered. 
One, where the number of ‘O’ is less than or equal to the half of the world average 
observations (Wao) and the other where the number of observations is more than 
half of the world average observations.  
 
In the first case, the number of “O” is multiplied by 0.6, whereas, in the second 
case, the number of “O” is multiplied by 0.4 to get points for the ‘Observations’ 
(VO) for a State. On similar lines, the number of ‘Findings’ that a State gets is 
compared with half of the world average findings (Waf). Thus two band-widths 
are considered. One, where the number of ‘F’ is less than or equal to the half of 
the world average findings and the other where the number of findings is more 
than half of the world average findings. In the first case, the number of “F” is 
multiplied by (-0.2), whereas, in the second case, the number of “F” is multiplied 
by (-0.4) to get negative points for the ‘Findings’ (VF) for the State. 
 
Thus the total points (VT) that a State gets VT = VY + VO - VF. The world total 
points (VWT) are then computed by adding total points gained by all States. The 
percentage of the world total points that a State gains directly gives the weight for 
the State for IMSAS audit as classifier (100 * [VT / VWT]). As this weight is 
computed based on the percentage of world total points gained, it reflects relative 
performance of a State compared to the other States. 
5.5.2. Tonnage 
Tonnage acquired by a State is a directly quantifiable classifier to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a State in implementing the IMO instruments on its vessels. The 
tonnage acquired by a State is the tonnage actually registered with the State and 
the State is obligated to ensure that the vessels flying its flag are in compliance 
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with the mandatory instruments that the State has ratified. The registered tonnage 
of a State is thus an important classifier.  
 
Detention of a ship by port State control is a measure of the non-compliance of a 
ship with the IMO instruments. Also, the ship involved in any casualty incident is 
an indicator of non-compliance of IMO instruments in some way. The flag State 
is definitely responsible for the detention, however the recognized organization of 
the State and the company to which the ship belongs also play role in the detention. 
As per Resolution A. 1070(28) of IMO, the State may delegate its various 
responsibilities to the organizations recognized by it and remaining responsible 
for their work while the accountability and the consequences resulting from non-
compliance is not defined. Also, as per Regulation 4 of Chapter IX of SOLAS, the 
company managing the ship is required to have a Document of Compliance issued 
by or on behalf of flag. Thus the State is responsible for authorising organizations 
for delegating authority to such organizations and also for the company managing 
the ship.  
 
In view of the above mentioned reasons, only registered tonnage (TR) could not 
be used for evaluating the performance of a State towards the ships that fly its 
flag. State being responsible for itself, for the recognized organization and for the 
company should therefore be penalised for a detained ship and for the ship 
involved in casualty incident. The author would like to recommend reduction of 
twice the tonnage of ships detained (TD) and ships involved in casualty incidents 
(TC), (twice in order to include the recognized organization and the company).  
 
Therefore the total tonnage of a State (TT) would be TT= TR – 2(TD + TC). The 
world total tonnage (TWT) is then computed by summing up the total tonnage of 
all States. The percentage of the world total tonnage that a State acquires directly 
gives the weight for the State’s tonnage as classifier (100 * [TT / TWT]). As this 
weight is computed based on the percentage of world total tonnage that has not 
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been detained or involved in casualty incident, it reflects relative performance of 
a State compared to the other States in maintaining IMO instruments complying 
ships.  
5.5.3. Seafarer 
Seafarers are the backbone of maritime industry and the most important aspect of 
shipping. Recent trend shows the unwillingness of young generation to join ships 
which require States’ intervention in motivating youngsters to pursue shipping as 
career and train them accordingly. Number of trained, qualified, and competent 
seafarers provided by a State to the world maritime industry is therefore an 
important maritime service to be justified as classifier. Number of certificates of 
competency issued in a year could directly be used for quantifying the classifier. 
Number of endorsements issued per year after training e.g. the endorsements 
issued for dangerous cargo could also be used along with the certificates of 
competency. Thus, points gained through this classifier reflect the States’ strength 
of imparting maritime knowledge, assessment, conducting exams, and issuing 
certificates for a year. The endorsements issued for recognition of certificates 
issued by other State is not considered as it does not reflect the State’s own efforts 
to qualify the seafarer.  
State is also responsible to ensure that the seafarers on board their ships possess 
authentic certificates and not fraudulent ones and also investigate such cases. The 
item 6.2.1 of the Code on International Safety Management, makes it mandatory 
for the company to ensure that the ship is manned with qualified and certified 
seafarers in accordance with the national and international requirements. State 
should be penalised if any seafarer is found sailing with fraudulent certificate 
because the Safety Management Certificate is issued to the ship by flag or on 
behalf of flag. Let the total number of certificates of competency (CC) and total 
number of endorsements issued after training (CE) and let (CF) be the number of 
fraudulent certificates found on board ships of the State for the last five years.  
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The total points gained by State for the seafarer (CT) as classifier would be CT = 
CC + CE – 10* CF, and the total points gained by all States are then summed up to 
get the world total points for certificates (CWT). The percentage of the world total 
certificates that a State issues directly gives the weight for the State’s seafarer as 
classifier (100 * [CT / CWT]). As this weight is computed based on the percentage 
of world total genuinely issued certificates that has not been fraudulent, it reflects 
relative performance of a State compared to the other States in its efforts for 
training a seafarer.  
5.5.4. Service – Search and Rescue 
Saving life is of primary importance and therefore the search and rescue service 
provided by a State is considered as an important classifier. The “Search and 
rescue service” as defined by item 1.3.3 of Annex to the SAR, 1979, as “the 
performance of distress monitoring, communication, coordination and search and 
rescue functions, including provision of medical advice, initial medical assistance, 
or medical evacuation, through the use of public and private resources including 
co-operating aircraft, vessels and other craft and installations”. In the same Annex, 
item 1.3.4 further defines the “Search and rescue region” as “an area of defined 
dimensions associated with a rescue coordination centre within which search and 
rescue services are provided”. 
 
There are many factors to be considered for saving life at sea and is very subjective 
depending upon the cost involved, the lives saved, and resources available among 
many others. However, the paper intends to limit itself to the lives saved and the 
region covered by the State as its responsibility. IAMSAR volume I, chapter 5, 
item 5.6.7, identifies two measures to relate the SAR system effectiveness. These 
measures are the programme effectiveness for preventing loss of sea and the 
programme effectiveness for preventing loss of property. The paper intends to 
utilize the formula for the  programme effectiveness for preventing loss of life at 
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sea which is given as effectiveness EEF (L) = LS / (LS + LLA) where ‘LS’ 
represents the lives saved and ‘LLA’ represents the lives lost after notification. 
Effectiveness of SAR operations for a State for saving life could thus be 
computed.  
 
Situations where the operation involved cooperation between States, effectiveness 
could be shared equally among the involved States. The world total effectiveness 
(EFF (L)WT) could then be computed by summing up effectiveness of all states. 
The world total effectiveness should not be misconstrued as world effectiveness 
which would be different. The world total effectiveness is considered for 
simplicity to evaluate relative performance of State with respect to each other. The 
percentage of the world total effectiveness for SAR that a State achieves directly 
gives the weight for the State’s SAR activities for preventing loss of life (100 * 
[EEF (L) / EFF (L)WT]). 
 
Search and rescue region responsibilities taken by a State needs to be considered. 
Let the SAR region covered by a State be ‘A’, then the world total area (AWT) 
covered would be sum of areas covered by all States. The percentage of the world 
total search and rescue region that a State takes responsibility for directly gives 
the weight for the State’s SAR activities for taking responsibility of the SAR 
region (100 * [A / AWT]). The average of the weight for the State’s SAR activities 
for preventing loss of life and the weight for the State’s SAR activities for taking 
responsibility of the SAR region covered gives the overall weight [ ((100 * [EEF 
(L) / EFF (L)WT]) + (100 * [A / AWT])) / 2 ] of the State’s SAR activity as a 
classifier. 
5.6. Check for appropriate representation 
The paper intends to check the effect of goal based voting weight as representation 
for the IMO decision making process. Consider ideal case where all States are 
performing perfectly alright giving equal weight to all for all classifiers. In that 
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scenario, each member would have 100X / N Fair Weight’s. Let the majority 
requirement quota be 50% which will require 50X of total ‘Fair Weight’. In order 
to achieve this quota, [(50X ) / (100X / N)], that is half of the members (N/2) will 
be required to vote for the proposed instrument which gives the majority rule as 
required for democratic decisions.  
Considering scenario, where half of the total members (N/2) members are 
absolutely non-performing and get zero weights. Therefore relatively, the ‘Fair 
Weight’ of the remaining half members would double giving each member a ‘Fair 
Weight’ of 200X/N. In this case, in order to meet the majority requirement of 50X, 
[(50X) / (200X / N)], that is N/4, i.e., only one-fourth members would require to 
pass the instrument. This would be truly justified because the failure of a member 
to comply with the IMO instruments has led to its voting weight reduction. This 
will additionally ensure some enforcement power to IMO. Thus the ‘Fair Weight’ 
voting and a well-defined quota would result in fair decision making process of 
the IMO. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The IMO utilizes a weighted voting system that gives prominent voting weights 
to the ship-owners through tonnage. This representation in the decision making 
process of IMO results in having the ship-owners as significant lobbyists and 
subsequent regulatory drivers. Voting power in IMO decision making processes 
are therefore mis-represented. The implementation and enforcement authority of 
the State is indirectly derived from the ship-owners which puts the State in a 
difficult position. Thus, it could be concluded that the ineffective implementation 
and enforcement of IMO instruments are primarily due to lack of appropriate 
representation of the Member States in the decision making process. 
Weighted voting systems are commonly employed in IOs when considering the 
equal representation principle of Member States. The choice of the classifier as a 
voting weight and the quota defined for majority requirement play the most 
important role in the decision making process of the IO. Voting weight chosen 
must be based on the foundational purpose and objective of the organization so 
that there is proper and relevant representation.  
It is clear now that IMO instrument decision making process remains in the 
interest of ship-owners. This is affecting its objective facilitation of safety of life 
at sea and the prevention of marine pollution in a broad sense. The failure of 
UNCCROS and BWM adoption are testimony to the powerlessness of IMO as an 
IO for the world maritime industry. The present methodology of representation in 
IMO decision making process might result in development of socially and 
economically based coalitions which will eventually be the drivers in IMO 
decision making process. If the situation continues in this manner, such dictating 
coalitions might be harmful to IMO’s reputation as an IO and might be detrimental 
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to the objectives of IMO in the coming future. The coastal States, maritime 
technology, seafarers, and all other stakeholders of the maritime industry other 
than the ship-owners may soon need to establish a new international organization 
for protecting their interest if IMO does not adequately represent them. 
The ‘Fair Weight’ introduced as a collective voting weight of various goal based 
classifiers for the instrument in question is expected to improve the representation 
in the IMO decision making process. The peculiar way of considering relative 
performance of a Member State for a classifier in evaluating the goal based voting 
weight will ensure “race to top” attitude among the Member States in order to 
have better voting power and representation in IMO decision making process. This 
competition is expected to motivate States to contribute more to the maritime 
industry as well as the under developed and developing nations to perform better 
in way of effective implementation of IMO instruments. The ‘Fair Weight’, thus 
is expected to empower the Member States for effective implementation and 
enforcement of IMO instruments within its jurisdiction. 
Hypothetically, if this new methodology of ‘Fair Weight’ was brought to the 
voting floor of IMO, it would be hard to imagine that the majority of Member 
States, representing a broad range of maritime activities, would not vote in favour. 
On the contrary, the large tonnage holding Member States would, of course, be 
apprehensive for this change because their influence in affecting instrument 
decisions would be reduced. However, the ultimate success would be a proper and 
appropriate representation of all Member States. 
6.1. Limitations 
The paper had quite a few limitations as the subject is too vast to be covered within 
the limited time to research. Although ‘equasis’ released 2014 statistics of world 
distribution of tonnage recently, the evaluation for voting weight and voting power 
was done considering tonnage data for the year 2013. No major change was 
noticed between the two which might affect the analysis considerably. The voting 
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power computation for IMO considering the voting weights constituting Member 
States consent and its tonnage requires detailed computer analysis. However, 
tonnage was only considered in voting power computation to get a fair idea of the 
voting power of Member States in IMO decision making process. The data of 
world tonnage was considered for the year 2013 as a general distribution of 
tonnage for IMO instruments for simplicity. Ideally the data at the time of 
adoption of a particular instrument is relevant for that instrument. Data considered 
for ineffective implementation of IMO instruments was the result of VIMSAS 
audit carried out by IMO. VIMSAS audit was mostly carried out for flag States, 
the actual results after the first cycle of IMSAS audit of all Member States might 
reveal other factors for ineffective implementation of IMO instruments by 
member States.  
6.2. Scope for further research 
The subject of legitimacy and the question of justified representation of the 
Member States in an international organization is being debated worldwide for its 
democratic character. While carrying out the literature review on the subject, 
various areas were identified that require further research in relation to IMO. 
Some of them are listed below. 
1. The various IMO instruments could be researched to identify and establish how 
the interest of the ship-owner was protected by IMO. This would result in studying 
the impact of representation on instrument. 
2. A thorough research could be carried out to identify the various parameters 
affecting the maritime industry and the need to have and maintain a database in 
order to carry out statistical study. The absence of measurable parameters led to 
the International Court of Justice accepting State owning registered tonnage as 
ship owning nation. 
3. A simple algorithm and a computer program could be developed to evaluate 
the various power indices to delve into the identification of impact of inadequate 
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representation in the voting power and the resultant ineffective implementation of 
IMO instruments. 
4.  There is need to identify the appropriate classifiers for an IMO instrument and 
finding their relative weightages based on worldwide surveys to appropriately 
represent in IMO instruments decision making process. 
5. Research is also needed to establish the appropriate contribution of Member 
States in IMO budget in order to refrain a section of maritime industry to exercise 
undue voting power in IMO’s decision making owing to its financial contribution. 
6. The current plan for the IMSAS audit for a Member State is based on a cycle 
of seven years and the audited items are not detailed to capture the minute data. A 
study needs to be carried out to list out all data that is necessary for evaluating 
performance of the Member State and a transparent system needs to be introduced 
to update the data on a regular basis. The study could additionally formulate 
methodology by which annual auditing could be carried out for all Member States. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 - List of Tables 
 
Table 1: IMO Member States and year joined 
 
Members and Associate 
Members 
Year 
joined  
Members and Associate 
Members 
Year 
joined 
Albania   1993   Madagascar 1961 
Algeria 1963   Malawi 1989 
Angola 1977   Malaysia 1971 
Antigua and Barbuda 1986   Maldives 1967 
Argentina 1953   Malta 1966 
Australia 1952   Marshall Islands 1998 
Austria 1975   Mauritania 1961 
Azerbaijan 1995   Mauritius 1978 
Bahamas 1976   Mexico 1954 
Bahrain 1976   Monaco 1989 
Bangladesh 1976   Mongolia 1996 
Barbados 1970   Montenegro 2006 
Belgium 1951   Morocco 1962 
Belize 1990   Mozambique 1979 
Benin 1980   Myanmar 1951 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1987   Namibia 1994 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993   Nepal 1979 
Brazil 1963   Netherlands 1949 
Brunei Darussalam 1984   New Zealand 1960 
Bulgaria 1960   Nicaragua 1982 
Cambodia 1961   Nigeria 1962 
Cameroon 1961   Norway 1958 
Canada 1948   Oman 1974 
Cabo Verde 1976   Pakistan 1958  
Chile 1972   Palau 2011 
China 1973   Panama 1958 
Colombia 1974   Papua New Guinea 1976 
Comoros 2001   Paraguay 1993 
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Members and Associate 
Members 
Year 
joined  
Members and Associate 
Members 
Year 
joined 
Congo 1975   Peru 1968 
Cook Islands 2008   Philippines 1964 
Costa Rica 1981   Poland 1960 
Côte d'Ivoire 1960   Portugal 1976 
Croatia 1992   Qatar 1977 
Cuba 1966   Republic of Korea 1962 
Cyprus 1973   Republic of Moldova 2001 
Czech Republic 1993   Romania 1965 
Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea 
1986   Russian Federation 1958 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo* 
1973   Saint Kitts and Nevis 2001 
Denmark 1959   Saint Lucia 1980 
Djibouti 1979   
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
1981 
Dominica 1979   Samoa 1996 
Dominican Republic 1953   San Marino 2002 
Ecuador 1956   Sao Tome and Principe 1990 
Egypt 1958   Saudi Arabia 1969 
El Salvador 1981   Senegal 1960 
Equatorial Guinea 1972   Serbia 2000 
Eritrea 1993   Seychelles 1978 
Estonia 1992   Sierra Leone 1973 
Ethiopia 1975   Singapore 1966 
Fiji 1983   Slovakia 1993 
Finland 1959   Slovenia 1993 
France 1952   Solomon Islands 1988 
Gabon 1976   Somalia 1978 
Gambia 1979   South Africa 1995 
Georgia 1993   Spain 1962 
Germany 1959   Sri Lanka 1972 
Ghana 1959   Sudan 1974 
Greece 1958   Suriname 1976 
Grenada 1998   Sweden 1959 
Guatemala 1983   Switzerland 1955 
Guinea 1975   Syrian Arab Republic 1963 
Guinea-Bissau 1977   Thailand 1973 
Guyana 1980   
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
1993 
Haiti 1953   Timor-Leste 2005 
Honduras 1954   Togo 1983 
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Members and Associate 
Members 
Year 
joined  
Members and Associate 
Members 
Year 
joined 
Hungary 1970   Tonga 2000 
Iceland 1960   Trinidad and Tobago 1965 
India 1959   Tunisia 1963 
Indonesia 1961   Turkey 1958 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1958   Turkmenistan 1993 
Iraq 1973   Tuvalu 2004 
Ireland 1951   Uganda 2009 
Israel 1952   Ukraine 1994 
Italy 1957   United Arab Emirates 1980 
Jamaica 1976   
UK of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
1949 
Japan 1958   
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
1974 
Jordan 1973   United States of America 1950 
Kazakhstan 1994   Uruguay 1968 
Kenya 1973   Vanuatu 1986 
Kiribati 2003   
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
1975 
Kuwait 1960   Viet Nam 1984 
Latvia 1993   Yemen 1979 
Lebanon 1966   Zambia 2014 
Liberia 1959   Zimbabwe 2005 
Libya 1970   Faroes (Assc. Member) 2002 
Lithuania 1995   
Hong Kong, China (Assc 
Member) 
1967 
Luxembourg 1991   
Macao, China (Assc. 
Member) 
1990 
 
(Source: http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx) 
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Table 2: IMO Membership year wise 
 
Year 
Members 
joined 
Total 
Members  Year 
Members 
joined 
Total 
Members 
1948 1 1  1982 1 119 
1949 2 3  1983 3 122 
1950 1 4  1984 2 124 
1951 3 7  1985 0 124 
1952 3 10  1986 3 127 
1953 3 13  1987 1 128 
1954 2 15  1988 1 129 
1955 1 16  1989 2 131 
1956 1 17  1990 3 134 
1957 1 18  1991 1 135 
1958 9 27  1992 2 137 
1959 7 34  1993 11 148 
1960 7 41  1994 3 151 
1961 5 46  1995 3 154 
1962 4 50  1996 2 156 
1963 4 54  1997 0 156 
1964 1 55  1998 2 158 
1965 2 57  1999 0 158 
1966 4 61  2000 2 160 
1967 2 63  2001 3 163 
1968 2 65  2002 2 165 
1969 1 66  2003 1 166 
1970 3 69  2004 1 167 
1971 1 70  2005 2 169 
1972 3 73  2006 1 170 
1973 8 81  2007 0 170 
1974 4 85  2008 1 171 
1975 5 90  2009 1 172 
1976 9 99  2010 0 172 
1977 3 102  2011 1 173 
1978 3 105  2012 0 173 
1979 6 111  2013 0 173 
1980 4 115  2014 1 174 
1981 3 118        
 
 
84 
 
Table 3: 2013 - Flag wise distribution of world gross tonnage 
 
World Gross Tonnage *1000 1,091,533.5640 
Member State 
2013 GT 
*1000 
% of world 
GT % Round up 
Panama 227,753.7650 20.86548 20.9 
Liberia 127,109.1870 11.64501 11.7 
Marshall Islands 85,443.1050 7.827804 7.9 
China, Hong Kong SAR 77,903.8320 7.137099 7.2 
Singapore 58,089.9140 5.321862 5.4 
Bahamas 54,511.3190 4.994012 5 
China 44,223.4880 4.051501 4.1 
Malta 44,112.6530 4.041346 4.1 
Greece 42,568.6440 3.899893 3.9 
United Kingdom 33,175.6740 3.039364 3.1 
Cyprus 20,463.6560 1.874762 1.9 
Italy 18,097.6230 1.658 1.7 
Norway 17,111.5070 1.567657 1.6 
Japan 15,732.3940 1.441311 1.5 
Germany 15,052.5850 1.379031 1.4 
Denmark 11,530.3260 1.056342 1.1 
Bermuda 11,503.1780 1.053855 1.1 
United States 11,278.8860 1.033306 1.1 
Korea, Republic of 11,148.5380 1.021365 1.1 
Antigua and Barbuda 10,933.6340 1.001676 1.1 
Indonesia 10,776.4060 0.987272 1 
India 9,534.3890 0.873486 0.9 
Malaysia 7,817.2130 0.716168 0.8 
Netherlands 7,758.5770 0.710796 0.8 
Turkey 6,857.9760 0.628288 0.7 
France 6,199.3220 0.567946 0.6 
Russian Federation 6,052.4800 0.554493 0.6 
United Republic of Tanzania 4,774.2200 0.437386 0.5 
Philippines 4,711.1130 0.431605 0.5 
Belgium 4,531.9010 0.415187 0.5 
Viet Nam 4,511.8010 0.413345 0.5 
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Member State 
2013 GT 
*1000 
% of world 
GT % Round up 
Cayman Islands 3,591.9890 0.329077 0.4 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3,504.8820 0.321097 0.4 
Sweden 3,242.9780 0.297103 0.3 
Thailand 3,040.3930 0.278543 0.3 
Canada 2,831.1380 0.259373 0.3 
Spain 2,792.2480 0.25581 0.3 
Kuwait 2,472.5920 0.226525 0.3 
Gibraltar 2,450.5350 0.224504 0.3 
China, Taiwan Province of 2,337.7960 0.214175 0.3 
Brazil 2,302.7960 0.210969 0.3 
Vanuatu 2,224.6920 0.203813 0.3 
Nigeria 2,119.9860 0.194221 0.2 
Finland 1,736.7160 0.159108 0.2 
Cambodia 1,730.8180 0.158568 0.2 
Belize 1,637.6520 0.150032 0.2 
Australia 1,612.3070 0.14771 0.2 
Luxembourg 1,498.2130 0.137258 0.2 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1,491.6480 0.136656 0.2 
Tuvalu 1,437.7110 0.131715 0.2 
Croatia 1,381.7450 0.126587 0.2 
Mexico 1,336.0720 0.122403 0.2 
Curaçao 1,302.1520 0.119296 0.2 
Egypt 1,171.3990 0.107317 0.2 
Sierra Leone 1,157.1620 0.106012 0.2 
Saudi Arabia 1,156.5490 0.105956 0.2 
Dominica 1,143.0220 0.104717 0.2 
Portugal 1,131.3520 0.103648 0.2 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic 
of) 1,111.3260 0.101813 0.2 
Bangladesh 1,049.0770 0.09611 0.1 
Barbados 1,022.6900 0.093693 0.1 
United Arab Emirates 989.5150 0.090654 0.1 
Qatar 902.8600 0.082715 0.1 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 898.0810 0.082277 0.1 
Azerbaijan 767.6150 0.070324 0.1 
Algeria 757.2610 0.069376 0.1 
Libya 753.3810 0.06902 0.1 
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Member State 
2013 GT 
*1000 
% of world 
GT % Round up 
Switzerland 714.0760 0.06542 0.1 
Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 701.0590 0.064227 0.1 
Comoros 685.5550 0.062807 0.1 
Ukraine 595.2930 0.054537 0.1 
Chile 549.2980 0.050324 0.1 
Brunei Darussalam 542.1580 0.049669 0.1 
Togo 535.8410 0.049091 0.1 
Bahrain 534.4230 0.048961 0.1 
Republic of Moldova 479.8050 0.043957 0.1 
Honduras 470.1100 0.043069 0.1 
Mongolia 425.8510 0.039014 0.1 
Pakistan 391.0160 0.035823 0.1 
Tunisia 358.6610 0.032858 0.1 
Bulgaria 356.8820 0.032695 0.1 
Lithuania 354.0260 0.032434 0.1 
Argentina 349.8340 0.03205 0.1 
Seychelles 337.2640 0.030898 0.1 
Cook Islands 330.0170 0.030234 0.1 
Cameroon 327.1570 0.029972 0.1 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 322.3670 0.029533 0.1 
Georgia 320.6490 0.029376 0.1 
Israel 290.5680 0.02662 0.1 
Kiribati 290.3290 0.026598 0.1 
Estonia 290.1340 0.02658 0.1 
Peru 268.5830 0.024606 0.1 
Morocco 254.4700 0.023313 0.1 
Ecuador 239.4670 0.021939 0.1 
Yemen 220.8410 0.020232 0.1 
Faeroe Islands 217.7210 0.019946 0.1 
Gabon 210.5070 0.019285 0.1 
Ireland 177.3040 0.016244 0.1 
Sri Lanka 172.6570 0.015818 0.1 
New Zealand 171.7440 0.015734 0.1 
Angola 169.6920 0.015546 0.1 
Myanmar 163.8650 0.015012 0.1 
Jamaica 161.2390 0.014772 0.1 
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Member State 
2013 GT 
*1000 
% of world 
GT % Round up 
Ethiopia 160.1060 0.014668 0.1 
Latvia 152.0780 0.013933 0.1 
Romania 141.2860 0.012944 0.1 
Lebanon 132.5150 0.01214 0.1 
Papua New Guinea 115.0620 0.010541 0.1 
Syrian Arab Republic 110.7110 0.010143 0.1 
Kazakhstan 103.9070 0.009519 0.1 
Mauritius 103.6440 0.009495 0.1 
Poland 101.6860 0.009316 0.1 
Dominican Republic 98.6430 0.009037 0.1 
Iraq 92.1720 0.008444 0.1 
Colombia 85.0460 0.007791 0.1 
Maldives 82.6220 0.007569 0.1 
Turkmenistan 74.8940 0.006861 0.1 
Jordan 72.5640 0.006648 0.1 
South Africa 69.6240 0.006379 0.1 
Uruguay 63.6820 0.005834 0.1 
Albania 63.1060 0.005781 0.1 
Paraguay 53.6050 0.004911 0.1 
Montenegro 50.6980 0.004645 0.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 45.3970 0.004159 0.1 
Tonga 41.9970 0.003848 0.1 
Cape Verde 34.5610 0.003166 0.1 
Belarus 33.6690 0.003085 0.1 
Guyana 33.6320 0.003081 0.1 
Slovakia 33.2610 0.003047 0.1 
Fiji 30.1670 0.002764 0.1 
Cuba 30.0790 0.002756 0.1 
Oman 27.3300 0.002504 0.1 
Sudan 24.6900 0.002262 0.1 
Madagascar 21.7360 0.001991 0.1 
Ghana 21.6370 0.001982 0.1 
Sao Tome and Principe 20.0910 0.001841 0.1 
Mozambique 19.3700 0.001775 0.1 
Iceland 16.4620 0.001508 0.1 
Equatorial Guinea 16.3610 0.001499 0.1 
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Member State 
2013 GT 
*1000 
% of world 
GT % Round up 
French Polynesia 13.5310 0.00124 0.1 
Eritrea 12.3750 0.001134 0.1 
Samoa 11.0180 0.001009 0.1 
Gambia 10.5200 0.000964 0.1 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 10.2430 0.000938 0.1 
Senegal 9.3610 0.000858 0.1 
Kenya 8.9190 0.000817 0.1 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 8.8600 0.000812 0.1 
Micronesia (Federated States of) 8.6150 0.000789 0.1 
Namibia 8.1620 0.000748 0.1 
Djibouti 6.6890 0.000613 0.1 
British Virgin Islands 6.6580 0.00061 0.1 
Greenland 5.2700 0.000483 0.1 
Suriname 4.9020 0.000449 0.1 
Costa Rica 4.8480 0.000444 0.1 
Solomon Islands 4.6310 0.000424 0.1 
New Caledonia 4.2270 0.000387 0.1 
Guinea 3.7950 0.000348 0.1 
Slovenia 2.6710 0.000245 0.1 
Côte d'Ivoire 2.2500 0.000206 0.1 
China, Macao SAR 2.0070 0.000184 0.1 
Afghanistan 1.8530 0.00017 0.1 
Nicaragua 1.7300 0.000158 0.1 
Guinea-Bissau 1.6660 0.000153 0.1 
Congo 1.2130 0.000111 0.1 
Grenada 1.1220 0.000103 0.1 
Mauritania 1.0600 9.71E-05 0.1 
Benin 1.0270 9.41E-05 0.1 
Guatemala 0.9090 8.33E-05 0.1 
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.7460 6.83E-05 0.1 
Haiti 0.7440 6.82E-05 0.1 
Guam 0.7230 6.62E-05 0.1 
Somalia 0.7210 6.61E-05 0.1 
Anguilla 0.5920 5.42E-05 0.1 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.4830 4.42E-05 0.1 
Austria 0.3730 3.42E-05 0.1 
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Member State 
2013 GT 
*1000 
% of world 
GT % Round up 
El Salvador 0.2690 2.46E-05 0.1 
Aruba 0.2210 2.02E-05 0.1 
Northern Mariana Islands 0.1620 1.48E-05 0.1 
 
 
 
(Source : http://knoema.com/UNCTADMF2013/merchant-fleet-by-flag-of-
registration-and-by-type-of-ship-annual-1980-2013-august-2013) 
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Table 4: Computed various power indices using ipmmle algorithm 
 
World Gross 
Tonnage * 1000 1,091,533.5640 
Member States 
Voting 
Weight 
of 
Tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Panama 20.9 0.603517 0.219646 0.522257 0.714725 
Liberia 11.7 0.280581 0.102115 0.242802 0.332282 
Marshall Islands 7.9 0.183782 0.066886 0.159037 0.217647 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
7.2 0.167548 0.060978 0.144989 0.198421 
Singapore 5.4 0.125455 0.045658 0.108563 0.148572 
Bahamas 5 0.115983 0.042211 0.100366 0.137354 
China 4.1 0.094952 0.034557 0.082168 0.112449 
Malta 4.1 0.094952 0.034557 0.082168 0.112449 
Greece 3.9 0.090293 0.032862 0.078136 0.106931 
United Kingdom 3.1 0.071695 0.026093 0.062042 0.084906 
Cyprus 1.9 0.043892 0.015974 0.037982 0.051979 
Italy 1.7 0.039266 0.014291 0.033979 0.046501 
Norway 1.6 0.036954 0.013449 0.031978 0.043763 
Japan 1.5 0.034642 0.012608 0.029978 0.041026 
Germany 1.4 0.032331 0.011767 0.027978 0.038288 
Denmark 1.1 0.025399 0.009244 0.021979 0.030079 
Bermuda 1.1 0.025399 0.009244 0.021979 0.030079 
United States 1.1 0.025399 0.009244 0.021979 0.030079 
Korea, Republic of 1.1 0.025399 0.009244 0.021979 0.030079 
Antigua and Barbuda 1.1 0.025399 0.009244 0.021979 0.030079 
Indonesia 1 0.023089 0.008403 0.01998 0.027344 
India 0.9 0.02078 0.007563 0.017982 0.024609 
Malaysia 0.8 0.01847 0.006722 0.015983 0.021874 
Netherlands 0.8 0.01847 0.006722 0.015983 0.021874 
Turkey 0.7 0.016161 0.005882 0.013985 0.019139 
France 0.6 0.013852 0.005041 0.011987 0.016404 
Russian Federation 0.6 0.013852 0.005041 0.011987 0.016404 
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Member States 
Voting 
Weight 
of 
Tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
0.5 0.011543 0.004201 0.009989 0.01367 
Philippines 0.5 0.011543 0.004201 0.009989 0.01367 
Belgium 0.5 0.011543 0.004201 0.009989 0.01367 
Viet Nam 0.5 0.011543 0.004201 0.009989 0.01367 
Cayman Islands 0.4 0.009234 0.003361 0.007991 0.010936 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
0.4 0.009234 0.003361 0.007991 0.010936 
Sweden 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Thailand 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Canada 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Spain 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Kuwait 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Gibraltar 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
China, Taiwan 
Province of 
0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Brazil 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Vanuatu 0.3 0.006926 0.002521 0.005993 0.008202 
Nigeria 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Finland 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Cambodia 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Belize 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Australia 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Tuvalu 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Croatia 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Mexico 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Curaçao 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Egypt 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Sierra Leone 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Saudi Arabia 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Dominica 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
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Member States 
Voting 
Weight 
of 
Tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Portugal 0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
0.2 0.004617 0.00168 0.003995 0.005468 
Bangladesh 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Barbados 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
United Arab Emirates 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Qatar 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Azerbaijan 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Algeria 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Libya 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Switzerland 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Korea, Dem. People's 
Rep. of 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Comoros 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Ukraine 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Chile 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Brunei Darussalam 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Togo 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Bahrain 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Republic of Moldova 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Honduras 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Mongolia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Pakistan 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Tunisia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Bulgaria 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Lithuania 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Argentina 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Seychelles 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Cook Islands 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Cameroon 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Georgia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
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Member States 
Voting 
Weight 
of 
Tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Israel 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Kiribati 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Estonia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Peru 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Morocco 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Ecuador 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Yemen 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Faeroe Islands 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Gabon 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Ireland 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Sri Lanka 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
New Zealand 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Angola 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Myanmar 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Jamaica 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Ethiopia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Latvia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Romania 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Lebanon 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Papua New Guinea 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Kazakhstan 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Mauritius 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Poland 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Dominican Republic 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Iraq 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Colombia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Maldives 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Turkmenistan 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Jordan 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
South Africa 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Uruguay 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Albania 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
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Member States 
Voting 
Weight 
of 
Tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Paraguay 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Montenegro 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Tonga 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Cape Verde 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Belarus 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Guyana 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Slovakia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Fiji 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Cuba 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Oman 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Sudan 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Madagascar 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Ghana 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Mozambique 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Iceland 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Equatorial Guinea 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
French Polynesia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Eritrea 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Samoa 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Gambia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Senegal 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Kenya 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Micronesia (Federated 
States of) 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Namibia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Djibouti 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
British Virgin Islands 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
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Member States 
Voting 
Weight 
of 
Tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Greenland 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Suriname 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Costa Rica 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Solomon Islands 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
New Caledonia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Guinea 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Slovenia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
China, Macao SAR 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Afghanistan 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Nicaragua 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Guinea-Bissau 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Congo 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Grenada 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Mauritania 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Benin 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Guatemala 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Haiti 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Guam 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Somalia 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Anguilla 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Lao People's Dem. 
Rep. 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Austria 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
El Salvador 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Aruba 0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
Northern Mariana 
Islands 
0.1 0.002308 0.00084 0.001998 0.002734 
 
 
(Source : Computation using Voting Power Algorithm, 
http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/cgi-vpi/ipmmle.cgi) 
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Table 5: World fleet registered trading vessels of 100 gross tons and over: 
gross tonnage on selected registers: 2011-2014 
 
   Gross tonnage (million), as at end year  
  2011 2012 2013 2014 
World Total 983.1 1,034.3 1,072.5 1,111.9 
European Union 207.4 205.1 210.6 218.2 
United Kingdom (inc IOM and 
CI) 29.4 30.0 28.8 27.0 
Cyprus 20.7 19.7 20.3 20.6 
Denmark 11.3 11.3 12.2 14.0 
France 6.4 5.6 5.3 5.1 
Germany 15.3 13.7 12.3 11.1 
Greece 41.1 41.1 41.5 42.4 
Italy 18.1 18.0 17.6 15.9 
Malta 43.8 45.0 49.6 55.9 
Netherlands 6.7 6.6 6.9 6.8 
Spain 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 
Sweden 3.3 2.8 2.7 2.6 
Antigua & Barbuda 11.1 10.6 10.0 9.5 
Bahamas 48.1 48.3 48.5 50.3 
Bermuda 10.6 10.9 10.5 10.4 
Brazil 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 
Cambodia 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Canada 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.5 
Cayman Islands 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.4 
China 35.6 38.8 41.1 42.6 
Hong Kong 67.8 78.5 85.4 92.6 
India 8.9 8.5 8.2 8.2 
Indonesia 9.1 10.1 11.1 11.2 
Iran 0.5 2.1 3.1 3.0 
Japan 16.7 17.8 19.2 20.4 
Korea, South 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.3 
Kuwait 2.4 2.4 2.2 3.0 
Liberia 116.7 123.8 124.1 123.8 
Malaysia 7.1 6.2 5.7 5.7 
Marshall Islands 71.1 81.1 90.0 105.5 
Norway 14.3 14.4 14.5 13.6 
Panama 208.4 215.8 217.2 213.7 
Philippines 5.0 4.3 4.3 4.2 
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   Gross tonnage (million), as at end year  
  2011 2012 2013 2014 
Singapore 51.2 59.2 67.7 75.0 
Taiwan 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.3 
Thailand 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.1 
Turkey 6.2 6.4 5.9 5.7 
United States of America 10.2 9.9 9.7 9.5 
 
(Source: Technical Notes - Table FLE0501   
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/230408/shipping-fleet-tech-note.pdf) 
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Table 6: Computed various power indices using ipmmle algorithm (quota = 
50%) 
 
Member State 
% of 
world 
gross 
tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
European Union 17.26 0.47823 0.1826 0.69593 0.36428 
Panama 16.9 0.46317 0.17686 0.67402 0.35281 
Liberia 9.79 0.25812 0.09856 0.37562 0.19661 
Marshall Islands 8.34 0.21452 0.08191 0.31218 0.16341 
Hong Kong 7.32 0.18764 0.07165 0.27306 0.14293 
Singapore 5.93 0.15036 0.05741 0.21881 0.11453 
Malta 4.42 0.11282 0.04308 0.16418 0.08594 
Bahamas 3.97 0.1 0.03818 0.14553 0.07617 
China 3.37 0.08478 0.03237 0.12337 0.06458 
Greece 3.36 0.08453 0.03227 0.123 0.06438 
United Kingdom 
(inc IOM and CI) 
2.13 0.05347 0.02042 0.07781 0.04073 
Cyprus 1.63 0.0409 0.01562 0.05951 0.03115 
Japan 1.61 0.04039 0.01542 0.05878 0.03077 
Italy 1.25 0.03135 0.01197 0.04562 0.02388 
Denmark 1.11 0.02784 0.01063 0.04051 0.0212 
Norway 1.08 0.02708 0.01034 0.03941 0.02063 
Korea, South 0.89 0.02232 0.00852 0.03248 0.017 
Indonesia 0.89 0.02232 0.00852 0.03248 0.017 
Germany 0.88 0.02207 0.00843 0.03211 0.01681 
Bermuda 0.83 0.02081 0.00795 0.03029 0.01585 
United States of 
America 
0.75 0.0188 0.00718 0.02737 0.01432 
Antigua & Barbuda 0.75 0.0188 0.00718 0.02737 0.01432 
India 0.65 0.0163 0.00622 0.02372 0.01241 
Netherlands 0.54 0.01354 0.00517 0.0197 0.01031 
Malaysia 0.45 0.01128 0.00431 0.01642 0.00859 
Turkey 0.45 0.01128 0.00431 0.01642 0.00859 
Russia 0.44 0.01103 0.00421 0.01605 0.0084 
France 0.41 0.01028 0.00393 0.01496 0.00783 
Philippines 0.33 0.00827 0.00316 0.01204 0.0063 
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Member State 
% of 
world 
gross 
tonnage 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
index) 
Normalised 
Banzhaf 
Index 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Cayman Islands 0.27 0.00677 0.00258 0.00985 0.00516 
Taiwan 0.26 0.00652 0.00249 0.00949 0.00497 
Thailand 0.25 0.00627 0.00239 0.00912 0.00477 
Kuwait 0.24 0.00602 0.0023 0.00876 0.00458 
Iran 0.24 0.00602 0.0023 0.00876 0.00458 
Sweden 0.21 0.00526 0.00201 0.00766 0.00401 
Canada 0.19 0.00476 0.00182 0.00693 0.00363 
Brazil 0.17 0.00426 0.00163 0.0062 0.00325 
Spain 0.17 0.00426 0.00163 0.0062 0.00325 
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
0.16 0.00401 0.00153 0.00584 0.00306 
Cambodia 0.1 0.00251 0.00096 0.00365 0.00191 
 
(Source : Computation using Voting Power Algorithm, 
http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/cgi-vpi/ipmmle.cgi) 
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Table 7: Computed various power indices using ipmmle algorithm for top 
26 Member States for UNCCROS (quota = 25 %) 
 
Member State 
% 
tonnage 
Weight 
Absolute 
Banzhaf Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Panama 20.9 0.013404 0.017457 0.010879 
Liberia 11.7 0.013333 0.017365 0.010821 
Marshall Islands 7.9 0.012571 0.016372 0.010202 
China, Hong Kong SAR 7.2 0.012175 0.015856 0.009881 
Singapore 5.4 0.010411 0.013558 0.008449 
Bahamas 5 0.009848 0.012826 0.007993 
China 4.1 0.008384 0.010918 0.006804 
Malta 4.1 0.008384 0.010918 0.006804 
Greece 3.9 0.008021 0.010446 0.00651 
United Kingdom 3.1 0.006503 0.00847 0.005278 
Cyprus 1.9 0.004069 0.0053 0.003303 
Italy 1.7 0.00365 0.004753 0.002962 
Norway 1.6 0.003439 0.004479 0.002791 
Japan 1.5 0.003227 0.004203 0.002619 
Germany 1.4 0.003015 0.003927 0.002447 
Denmark 1.1 0.002375 0.003093 0.001928 
Bermuda 1.1 0.002375 0.003093 0.001928 
United States 1.1 0.002375 0.003093 0.001928 
Korea, Republic of 1.1 0.002375 0.003093 0.001928 
Antigua and Barbuda 1.1 0.002375 0.003093 0.001928 
Indonesia 1 0.002161 0.002814 0.001754 
India 0.9 0.001946 0.002534 0.001579 
Malaysia 0.8 0.001731 0.002254 0.001405 
Netherlands 0.8 0.001731 0.002254 0.001405 
Turkey 0.7 0.001515 0.001973 0.00123 
France 0.6 0.001299 0.001692 0.001054 
 
(Source: tonnage data from http://knoema.com/UNCTADMF2013/merchant-
fleet-by-flag-of-registration-and-by-type-of-ship-annual-1980-2013-august-
2013) 
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Table 8: Computed various power indices using ipmmle algorithm for top 
30 Member States for BWM (quota = 35 %) 
 
Member State 
% 
tonnage 
Weight 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Panama 20.9 0.138147 0.117649 0.167294 
Liberia 11.7 0.12337 0.105065 0.1494 
Marshall Islands 7.9 0.090482 0.077057 0.109573 
China, Hong Kong SAR 7.2 0.082294 0.070083 0.099657 
Singapore 5.4 0.06143 0.052315 0.074391 
Bahamas 5 0.056931 0.048483 0.068942 
China 4.1 0.046651 0.039729 0.056494 
Malta 4.1 0.046651 0.039729 0.056494 
Greece 3.9 0.044373 0.037789 0.053736 
United Kingdom 
3.1 0.035266 0.030033 0.042706 
Cyprus 1.9 0.021611 0.018404 0.026171 
Italy 1.7 0.019336 0.016467 0.023416 
Norway 1.6 0.018198 0.015498 0.022038 
Japan 1.5 0.017061 0.014529 0.02066 
Germany 1.4 0.015923 0.013561 0.019283 
Denmark 1.1 0.012511 0.010655 0.015151 
Bermuda 1.1 0.012511 0.010655 0.015151 
United States 1.1 0.012511 0.010655 0.015151 
Korea, Republic of 1.1 0.012511 0.010655 0.015151 
Antigua and Barbuda 1.1 0.012511 0.010655 0.015151 
Indonesia 
1 0.011374 0.009686 0.013773 
India 0.9 0.010236 0.008717 0.012396 
Malaysia 0.8 0.009099 0.007749 0.011018 
Netherlands 0.8 0.009099 0.007749 0.011018 
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Member State 
% 
tonnage 
Weight 
Absolute 
Banzhaf 
Index 
(Penrose 
Index) 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Prevent 
Action 
Coleman's 
Power to 
Initiate 
Action 
Turkey 0.7 0.007961 0.00678 0.009641 
France 0.6 0.006824 0.005811 0.008264 
Russian Federation 
0.6 0.006824 0.005811 0.008264 
United Republic of Tanzania 0.5 0.005687 0.004843 0.006886 
Philippines 0.5 0.005687 0.004843 0.006886 
Belgium 0.5 0.005687 0.004843 0.006886 
 
(Source: tonnage data from http://knoema.com/UNCTADMF2013/merchant-
fleet-by-flag-of-registration-and-by-type-of-ship-annual-1980-2013-august-
2013) 
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Appendix 2 - Algorithm for computing Shapley-Shubik power index 
 
 *** Algorithm to find pivotal member 
 
Variables: Quota = 0; PV_MS = 0; Min_MS = 25 
Array Tonnage [T1, T2……….T174] 
For (i=1; i<=174; i++) 
 { 
     if Quota < 50, 
  { 
      Quota = [Tonnage]i + Quota 
      PV_MS = i 
  } 
    else 
  { 
      if 
   PV_MS >= Min_MS 
   Return PV_MS 
      else 
   PV_MS = i 
  } 
 } 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Algorithm to find number of times each Member State is pivotal 
member 
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Variables: Quota = 0; PV_Count = 0; Min_MS = 25 
Array Tonnage [T1, T2……….T174], Counter [Counter1, 
Counter2,….Counter174] 
for (j=1; j<=174!; j++) 
 { 
     for (i = 1; i<=174; i++) 
  { 
           if Quota < 50, 
   { 
             Quota = [Tonnage]i + Quota 
                    PV_MS = i 
   } 
          else 
   { 
             If 
          PV_MS >= Min_MS 
          Counter i = Counter i + 1 
          break 
                   else 
    PV_MS = i 
   } 
  } 
} 
 
Shapley-Shubik Power Index = Counter i / 174! 
 
